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We consider a market for an experience good1 and analyze in particular which quality levels–
out of a continuum of technologically feasible levels–are oﬀered in equilibrium. Our results
can explain the casual observation that in many markets for experience goods quality is
generally low, and high quality is either impossible to ﬁnd or extremely expensive. Particular
examples of such markets, besides others, can be found among markets for agricultural
produce and food products. For instance, the markets for many vegetables and fruits are
divided into two quality segments, “ordinary” and organic. Organic products are supposedly
free of pesticides–and expensive. In contrast, ordinary products usually are produced with
signiﬁcant amounts of pesticides and are relatively cheap. Firms do not oﬀer, for intermediate
prices, agricultural products that have been produced with modest amounts of pesticides.
Moreover, consumers cannot observe the amount of pesticides used in the production of a
particular product or the contamination level, respectively. However, speciﬁcc h e c k sa n dt e s t s
by capable agencies can reveal this information. Accordingly, we assume, in our model, that
consumers cannot observe the true quality of the respective product even after consumption,
but that after purchase the true quality of the good will become publicly known with positive
probability.2
The lack of high quality products in a particular market may simply be the consequence
of customer preferences. Customers may just not be willing to pay the higher production
cost associated with better quality. In such a case complaints about the lack of high quality
are irrelevant from the point of view of market performance. However, we provide a plausible
1In our model experience goods are goods where (a) buyers cannot observe the quality of a particular
product before deciding whether or not to buy, (b) buyers detect with positive probability the quality of
the respective product after purchase, and (c) contracts cannot be conditioned on quality. This deﬁnition
diﬀers slightly from the usual deﬁnition in that even after purchase quality is detected only with positive
probability and not necessarily with certainty. It includes goods where a customer’s own experience will never
reveal the true quality, but checks by certain agencies will, e.g., tests by health authorities for hazardous
substances contained in a given product. The notion of experience goods has been introduced (together with
the complementary notion of inspection goods) by Nelson (1970).
2Unobservable quality is frequently associated with a product’s genetic, organic, and chemical properties
but may also relate to the respective production processes (e.g., as regards child labor, environmental im-
plications or animal welfare). Although consumers cannot detect these attributes by their own experience,
tests by public agencies or consumer organizations can ﬁnd out. Since in any given period only few goods
are tested, for a producer such tests are random events, and we will take account of this in our model.
1model where some or even all customers are perfectly willing to pay the higher production
cost (but not necessarily the higher price) associated with better quality. Nevertheless, under
certain conditions at most two diﬀerent levels of quality are oﬀered in equilibrium–one of
them being the lowest and the other one the highest among the technologically feasible levels.
Moreover, if high quality is available at all, then for a price that is high relative to production
cost.
In this study we combine two strains of literature, (i) the incentive approach to experience
goods (pioneered by Klein and Leﬄer 1981, and followed up by Shapiro 1983, and others3),
and (ii) the analysis of Bertrand equilibria in markets with vertical product diﬀerentiation
(see, e.g., Gabszewicz and Thisse 1979, 1980, and Shaked and Sutton 1982, 1983).4 The fact
that due to incentive or signalling reasons experience goods must have high prices relative to
cost, has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the equilibrium outcome. For example, for the duopoly case
Bester (1998) has shown that if in a standard Hotelling model of spatial competition the hor-
izontally diﬀerentiated good is an experience rather than an inspection good, the equilibrium
outcome may be “minimum diﬀerentiation” rather than “maximum diﬀerentiation.”
Ar e l a t e d ,b u td i ﬀerent approach deals with informational product diﬀerentiation as a
barrier to entry (see, e.g., Schmalensee 1982, Bagwell 1990). In these models customers’
informational diﬀerences with respect to diﬀerent brands may constitute a barrier to entry.
The informational diﬀerences are in fact diﬀerences with respect to supplier reputation.
Whereas the incumbent has reputation (the quality of his product is “known”), a new entrant
has no reputation (the quality of her product is not “known”). In contrast to this literature,
we abstract from reputation as much as possible.5 Speciﬁcally, we assume that customers
trust ﬁrms whenever conditional on this trust a ﬁrm has no incentive to “cheat,” i.e., to
3See, e.g., Bagwell and Riordan 1991, Bester 1998, Riordan 1986, Rogerson 1988, Wolinsky 1983, among
others.
4For a Cournot analysis of vertical product diﬀerentiation see, e.g., Gal-Or (1983). Gabszewicz and
Grilo (1992) analyze the Bertrand equilibrium of a vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly where consumers have
exogenous beliefs about which of the two ﬁrms sells high quality and which sells low quality. Another
strain of literature, based on Mussa and Rosen (1978), deals with quality provision by a monopolist (see,
e.g., Gabszewicz and Wauthy 2002 and the references therein). However, due to diﬀerences in focus the
conclusions of this literature are not readily comparable to our results.
5Nevertheless, reputation plays an important role in our model as well, as it is necessarily the case in
any model of an experience good market. However, in our model the role of reputation is more implicit. In
particular, we do not focus on how reputation is gained and lost and how it can be used strategically.
2provide lower quality than announced. This assumption captures a minimal requirement
for ﬁrms’ reputation. It only strengthens our conclusions, if it is more diﬃcult to acquire
reputation. Thus, our results do not depend on a good answer to the diﬃcult question of
how to gain and how to lose reputation.6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we present the model in Section 2.
Then, in Section 3, we derive the incentive compatibility constraints for ﬁrms to provide
high quality. In Section 4, we show that due to these incentive compatibility constraints only
low quality may be available in the market even though preferences for high quality may be
“strong” relative to production costs of high quality. In Section 5, we demonstrate that under
certain conditions equilibrium prices are determined by incentive compatibility constraints,
whereas customer preferences and the distribution of customer types only determine the
quantities demanded, given equilibrium prices. In Section 6, we analyze the case where
customers’ willingness to pay for quality is convex with respect to quality, and in Section 7
the case where it is concave. Finally, we conclude in Section 8. All mathematical proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
2. The Model
We consider a market for an experience good that is homogeneous except for quality.
That is, in our model there is (potentially) vertical product diﬀerentiation but no hori-
zontal product diﬀerentiation. Time is measured in discrete periods t ∈ {1,2,...}.T h e r e
is a pool of N ≥ 2 (N possibly inﬁnite) ﬁrms that are capable to produce each quality
v ∈ [0,1] of a given (experience) good at constant marginal cost c(v) > 0, where the function
c :[ 0 ,1] → R++ is strictly increasing. That is, marginal cost is independent of quantity but
increasing with respect to quality. Moreover, since c(v) is strictly increasing, quality can be
6Basically, for our conclusions we only need to assume that there is some way to gain reputation and that
a ﬁrm will lose its reputation, if it provides lower quality than promised. These assumptions are innocent. If
it is impossible to acquire the reputation of being a high quality producer, all products in the market will be
of low quality, and no additional analysis is needed. If it is impossible to lose reputation, the respective ﬁrm
will always provide low quality, and therefore among rational customers it will be impossible ever to acquire
the reputation of being a high quality producer. Of course, the details of how exactly a ﬁrm’s reputation
is inﬂuenced when it provides lower quality than promised, matter for the details of the ﬁrm’s incentive
compatibility constraint. However, our results depend on the existence, not on the details of that incentive
compatibility constraint.
3measured without loss of generality in such a way that cost is linear in quality, i.e.,
c(v)=c(0) + γv, (2.1)
where γ is some positive constant.7 Put diﬀerently, we use unit cost to measure quality.
In addition to the N ﬁrms that are capable to produce each of the technologically feasible
quality levels, there are inﬁnitely many ﬁrms that are capable of producing minimum quality
v =0at cost c(0). Although a ﬁrm may be capable of producing many quality levels, we
assume that in each period it can produce and oﬀer only one particular level of quality of
t h er e s p e c t i v ep r o d u c t .
In equilibrium not all ﬁr m sw i l lb ea c t i v ei nt h em a r k e ta n dp r o d u c e . F i r m st h a ta r e
active in the market are distinguished between “brand names” and “no names.” No names
produce only minimum quality v =0 , whereas brand names may produce any quality level
v ∈ [0,1]. Even if a no name is capable of producing positive quality, it will not do so because
customers believe that all no names provide only minimum quality (Assumption 3 below).
A brand name has to announce publicly the quality of its product in each period and we call
this the “announced quality.” Actual quality is private information of the ﬁrm and may or
may not coincide with the announced quality. Between periods brand names can change their
announced and actual quality levels, respectively. We assume that no names have no entry
cost, whereas each brand name has to incur a positive entry cost η > 0, identical for all ﬁrms,
in order to establish the respective brand together with an associated distribution channel.
A brand name that voluntarily leaves the market may enter again, either simultaneously or
later, but it has to pay the entry cost for each entry. Since no names have no entry cost, in
any equilibrium minimum quality is oﬀered under perfectly competitive conditions and the
respective price is c(0) in every period. All no names have zero payoﬀ. Brand names choose
their respective prices, together with their respective quality levels, simultaneously at the
beginning of each period. That is, we assume Bertrand competition.
In each period there is an atomless continuum of customers of (Lebesgue) measure 1.
Customers’ total expenditures are non-negative and uniformly bounded in every period.
7Let V ∈ [Vmin,V max] be any measure of quality with associated marginal cost C (V ) > 0 that increases
in V but is constant in quantity. Deﬁning v ≡ [C (V ) − C (Vmin)]/[C (Vmax) − C (Vmin)] ∈ [0,1] gives
the required normalized measurement of quality. For any quality level ˆ V with normalized equivalent ˆ v




= C (Vmin)+[ C (Vmax) − C (Vmin)] ˆ v = c(0) + γˆ v, where γ ≡
C (Vmax) − C (Vmin).
4Customers live one period and are distinguished by “types” s ∈ S =[ smin,s max] ⊂ R
according to their willingness to pay for quality. We assume that the cumulative distribution
function of s, denoted by F (s), has a density f (s). Customers’ preferences are speciﬁed by
the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (Customer Preferences). Each customer buys at most one unit of the
experience good. The payoﬀ from not buying the experience good is normalized to zero. For
customers of type s ∈ S the payoﬀ from buying one unit of the experience good of quality v
for the price p is given by U (v,p,s)=R(v,s)−p. For all v ∈ (0,1] and s ∈ S, the function
R(·,·) is strictly increasing in quality v.
If quality were immediately observable to customers and ﬁrms had no entry cost, com-
petition would drive the price for quality v, denoted by p(v), down to marginal cost c(v),
provided N is suﬃciently “large.” In the extreme case of no entry cost and a continuum of
ﬁrms, each customer type s ∈ S could ﬁnd a ﬁrm that oﬀers the level of quality that this type
p r e f e r sm o s ta tp r i c e sp(v)=c(v).8 In the particular situation where at prices p(v)=c(v)
all types prefer maximum quality v =1 , all ﬁrms would oﬀer the highest feasible quality
for the price c(1). However, we consider a good where neither buyers nor other ﬁrms can
observe the quality of a particular product, and contracts cannot be conditioned on quality.
In such a situation, a ﬁrm could save on cost by producing lower quality than announced,
and in the following we refer to such behavior as “cheating.”
There are many diﬀerent aspects of quality. Some of these the customer can observe
immediately (like whether a fruit is rotten), some she can detect after a relatively short
period of use (like the mileage of a car), some she can discern only after a long time (like
the durability of a good), and some she will never know with certainty (like some features
of product reliability, such as the probability of a breakdown). Moreover, some aspects, like
the content of certain hazardous elements in food or toys, can be detected by an appropriate
monitoring agency but not by the ordinary customer herself. We model the customers’
uncertainty about the quality of the respective good in a way that is consistent with the last
case (but not restricted to it). Speciﬁcally, Assumption 2 below covers the case where in
8The most preferred quality is either a corner solution (v =0or v =1 )o r ,a s s u m i n gd i ﬀerentiability,
satisﬁes the condition ∂R(v,s)/∂v = γ, i.e., at an interior optimum the marginal willingness to pay for
quality must equal the “marginal cost of quality.”
5e a c hp e r i o dt h et r u eq u a l i t yi sr e v e a l e dt ot h ep u b l i cw i t hs o m ep r o b a b i l i t yϕ ∈ (0,1], and
where with the complementary probability 1 − ϕ there is no information about a product’s
quality.
In some cases, the information that a certain product does not have the announced
quality may spread slowly and the ﬁrm which sells it in the market may be able to exploit the
reputation it has acquired in the past for a relatively long period after it has started to cheat.
In other cases, this information may become public almost instantaneously and force the ﬁrm
to close down. For example, a watchdog agency may randomly test brand names’ products,
and if the test shows that the true quality is below the announced quality the respective ﬁrm
may have to close down, e.g., because it loses its customers or is forced by a legal authority
to exit the market. The relevant point is not how fast or to what extent the respective
ﬁrm has to reduce its business, but that a cheating ﬁrm risks that it will be punished either
by the public or by a legal authority. The expected punishment gives rise to an incentive
compatibility constraint that, if satisﬁed, induces the ﬁrm to provide the announced quality.
Independent of the details of the model, this constraint necessarily implies that the price of
a good above minimum quality must be suﬃciently above its marginal cost. Otherwise the
ﬁrm would cheat and produce only minimum quality. Since customers cannot immediately
observe quality and contracts cannot be conditioned on quality, a ﬁrm that produces high
quality must earn an informational rent. The threat of losing this rent if it cheats provides
the incentive for the ﬁrm to actually produce the announced quality (Klein and Leﬄer 1981).
The previous discussion motivates the following assumption, which in particular captures
the case where watchdog agencies perform random tests of the brand names’ products with
some probability ϕ ∈ (0,1],a n dﬁrms caught cheating have to exit the market and receive a
payoﬀ of zero from that moment onwards.9, 10
9The assumption that the payoﬀ d r o p st oz e r oi sas i m p l i ﬁcation. For incentives a signiﬁcant reduction of
the payoﬀ (to a still positive value) is suﬃcient. Empirically, such reductions can be observed. For example,
Coyle (2002, pp. 29-30) points out (with respect to food quality): “A company involved in the spread of a
foodborne pathogen can .... face costs imposed by courts or government agencies, including ﬁnes, product
recalls, and temporary or permanent plant closures as well as large liability settlements and associated legal
costs. Potential market and liability losses are strong incentives for food ﬁrms to ensure the food supply is
as safe as possible.”
10This implies that a ﬁrm that has to close down has no physical capital or other assets to sell. If the ﬁrm
has some assets or a “scrap value,” this would change the speciﬁc form of the incentive constraint below,
but not the general argument. It would make a diﬀerence, though, if cheating ﬁrms could be forced to pay
6Assumption 2 (Quality Monitoring). If in any period t ∈ {1,2,...} t h et r u eq u a l i t yo fa
product is below the quality announced by its producer, the respective brand name has to exit
the market with positive probability ϕ ∈ (0,1] and receives a payoﬀ of zero from that moment
onwards.11 With the complementary probability 1−ϕ providing lower than announced quality
in any period t ∈ {1,2,...} has no eﬀect for the respective brand name.
The assumption that the punishment for cheating is market exit need not be taken
literally. The model covers all cases where brand names that cheat are punished in such
a way that in expectation a cheating brand name loses ϕ percent of its future payoﬀ.F o r
example, rather than having to leave the market with probability ϕ, a brand name that
cheats may lose ϕ percent of its customers for sure. Or it may lose ϕ/π percent of its
customers with probability π ∈ (0,1).
This is not a paper on reputation. Rather, we want to characterize the equilibrium
o u t c o m ew h e ni ti sa se a s ya sp o s s i b l ef o rﬁrms to acquire reputation for being a high
quality producer. Speciﬁcally, we assume that customers trust ﬁrms whenever conditional
on this trust the respective ﬁrm has no incentive to cheat.
Assumption 3 (Customer Beliefs). Customers cannot observe the true quality of a brand
name. They believe that the true quality is the announced quality, unless given these beliefs
it is optimal for a ﬁrm to provide lower quality. Otherwise, they believe that the true quality
is the minimum quality v =0 . No names are believed always to provide minimum quality.
We assume that all ﬁrms have the same discount rate ρ > 0. The associated discount
factor is denoted by δ ≡ 1
1+ρ ∈ (0,1).Aﬁrm’s payoﬀ is the discounted sum of its proﬁts per
period if it has entered the market, and zero otherwise. If more than one brand name oﬀers
the same quality v ∈ [0,1] and there is a unique ﬁrm that is the cheapest one, it gets all the
demand for this quality. If the cheapest brand name among those oﬀering the same quality
is not unique, all brand names that sell for the lowest price share the respective demand
equally.
Since no names have no entry cost, they always oﬀer quality v =0for the price p(0) =
c(0) under perfectly competitive conditions. Therefore, we restrict the terms “entry” and
arbitrary large ﬁnes. However, for ﬁnes below a certain threshold the general argument remains valid.
11The respective ﬁrm may be allowed to enter as a no name. Recall that all no names have a payoﬀ of
zero.
7“incumbent” to brand names. Moreover, because no names do not behave strategically, we
do not treat them explicitly as players in the game. In contrast, potential and actual brand
names act strategically. In their decisions they take the “competitive fringe” of no names
into account, as well as the strategies of the other players.
Our analysis is based on the following game. The set of players consists of brand names
and customers. Brand names know the distribution of customer preferences, but cannot
observe the individual types. The cost function (2.1) and the rest of the model are common
knowledge. In each period t ∈ {1,2,...}, the game proceeds in four stages. In the ﬁrst stage,
at the beginning of the period, brand names simultaneously decide whether to enter or,
respectively, to exit the market. That is, brand names that have not yet entered the market
decide whether to enter, and brand names that have entered in the past decide whether to
exit. In the second stage, still at the beginning of the period, all brand names in the market
observe the moves made in the ﬁrst stage and choose simultaneously announced quality,
actual quality, and price (each for the respective period). In the third stage, which takes
place at the end of the period, customers decide whether and from which supplier to buy
one unit of the good. These decisions are executed and the period’s payoﬀs accrue. Finally,
in stage four, each brand name that had provided some quality below the announced quality
has to leave the market forever with probability ϕ > 0. A brand name that has to leave the
market receives no further payoﬀ (but keeps the payoﬀs received so far).
Since we are not interested in collusion among ﬁrms, we want to rule out folk theorem
type results. In standard models this can be done by considering only those equilibria of the
dynamic game that consist of playing a particular equilibrium of the stage game in every
period. In our model the situation is somewhat diﬀerent because the only reason why ﬁrms
do not cheat are their future rents, and therefore the game that incumbent ﬁrms play in each
period is not the relevant “stage game.” In any one-period “stage game” (as well as in any
ﬁnite version of the dynamic game) incumbents would always cheat, and since customers
would anticipate this and thus not buy the respective product, no brand name would enter
the market and no positive quality would be available in equilibrium. In our model, the
analogue of an equilibrium (in pure strategies) of the dynamic game that consists of playing
an equilibrium of the stage game in every period, is what we call an equilibrium in stationary
strategies or, for short, a stationary equilibrium. We deﬁne a brand name’s strategy to be
stationary, if it satisﬁes the following two conditions: (i) the ﬁrm either enters the market in
8the ﬁrst period t =1or not at all; (ii) if the ﬁrm had entered, its announced quality, actual
quality, and price are constant in time and independent of the history of actions. Accordingly,
an equilibrium (in pure strategies) is stationary, if all equilibrium strategies are stationary. It
is the requirement that equilibrium strategies are independent of the history of actions that
prevents collusion. In a stationary equilibrium, equilibrium strategies are not only constant
along the equilibrium path but also at oﬀ-equilibrium nodes. However, this holds only for
equilibrium strategies. Deviating strategies are not constrained to be stationary.12 With the
important exception of Section 4, our equilibrium concept throughout the paper is the one
of a stationary equilibrium in pure strategies.13 For the results of Section 4 collusion plays
no role and therefore we consider all Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
3. Incentive Compatibility Constraints
In this section, we derive the incentive compatibility constraint (for short: incentive con-
straint) for a ﬁrm to provide a given quality ¯ v ∈ (0,1] in a stationary equilibrium. Consider
a stationary equilibrium, where in some period t a ﬁrm oﬀe r sap r o d u c to fs o m ea n n o u n c e d
and actual quality ¯ v ∈ (0,1] for some price ¯ p, sells ¯ x units in this period, and plans to do





τ−t [¯ p − c(¯ v)] ¯ x =
δ
1 − δ
[¯ p − c(¯ v)] ¯ x.
An alternative strategy is to cheat and provide only minimum quality for K ≥ 1 periods
(where K may be inﬁnite), risking involuntary exit; and to produce again quality ¯ v thereafter






τ−t (1 − ϕ)





τ−t [¯ p − c(¯ v)] ¯ x
= δ
1 − δ
K (1 − ϕ)
K
1 − δ(1 − ϕ)
[¯ p − c(0)] ¯ x + δ
K (1 − ϕ)
K δ
1 − δ
[¯ p − c(¯ v)] ¯ x.
12Below, we show in Lemma 1 of Section 5 that for stationary equilibria it is nevertheless suﬃcient to
consider stationary strategies.
13Since ﬁrms cannot observe each others’ actual qualities, there are no proper subgames. Therefore,
subgame perfection plays no role.
9Consequently, the resulting incentive constraint for the ﬁrm to actually provide quality ¯ v is
δ
1 − δ
[¯ p − c(¯ v)] ¯ x ≥ δ
1 − δ
K (1 − ϕ)
K
1 − δ(1 − ϕ)
[¯ p − c(0)] ¯ x + δ
K (1 − ϕ)
K δ
1 − δ
[¯ p − c(¯ v)] ¯ x.
Dividing by δ and rearranging gives
1 − δ
K (1 − ϕ)
K
1 − δ
[¯ p − c(¯ v)] ≥
1 − δ
K (1 − ϕ)
K
1 − δ(1 − ϕ)
[¯ p − c(0)],
or ¯ p ≥ c(¯ v)+1−δ
δϕ [c(¯ v) − c(0)] = c(¯ v)+1−δ
δϕ γ¯ v. Since 1−δ
δ = ρ, we get




In a stationary equilibrium, this inequality has to hold for all quality levels ¯ v ∈ (0,1] that
are actually produced.14 It cannot be that some quality ¯ v is sold at a lower price because at
a lower price the respective ﬁrm would cheat and this would be anticipated by its customers.
Let ˆ p(v) denote the minimum price for quality v ∈ [0,1] in a stationary equilibrium, i.e.,
ˆ p(v) ≡ c(v)+
ρ
ϕ
γv, v ∈ [0,1]. (3.2)
These prices include the “incentive” or “informational” cost
ρ
ϕγv in addition to the produc-
tion cost c(v).15 In any stationary equilibrium the price p(v) must satisfy
p(v) ≥ ˆ p(v) (3.3)
for each quality v ∈ [0,1] that is sold in the market.16
14It is easy to check that the incentive constraint is identical, if a brand name that cheats loses for sure
ϕ percent of its customers at the end of each period it had cheated (rather than having to exit the market
with probability ϕ).
15If the producer does not sell the product directly to customers but via dealers, the respective dealers
may have an opportunity to cheat by selling a fake product instead of the real one. In this case, similar to
the producer, a dealer must earn a rent in order not to cheat. Consequently, incentive costs accrue at the
dealer stage as well. A dealer’s incentive cost will show up as a higher markup on the cost price. If the
distribution channel for the good consists of several stages, the cumulative incentive costs may be very high.
In order to avoid too high a markup on the producer’s price, the producer may establish her own network of
stores or company outlets, although this would be ineﬃcient if no incentive costs accrued in the distribution
channel. In our model, we do not take such additional costs in selling the experience good into account.
However, the presence of such costs is a reason to regard ρ/ϕ as large.
16As Jean-Charles Rochet has pointed out to us, there is a related problem in the regulation of banks:
deposit-rate ceilings can be used as incentives for banks to invest in safe rather than in ineﬃciently risky
assets (“gambling assets”) because deposit-rate ceilings increase banks’ proﬁts per period and thus their
franchise (or charter) values (Hellmann et al. 2000, Repullo 2002).
104. Minimum Quality Only
Although the incentive constraints (3.3) have been derived for stationary equilibria, this
section shows that they have some relevance for all equilibria. We say that some given quality
v ∈ [0,1] is available in the market (for short: available)i ns o m ep e r i o dt,i fi np e r i o dt some
ﬁrm produces this quality v and oﬀers its product at a price which at least some costumers
are willing to pay, i.e., at a price that results in sales. Recall that by normalization every
customer’s payoﬀ is zero when she does not buy the good at all, and that minimum quality
v =0is always oﬀered for the price p(0) = c(0). Assume that some given quality ¯ v>0 is
oﬀered for some price p(¯ v) ≥ ˆ p(¯ v). If R(¯ v,s)− ˆ p(¯ v) < max[R(0,s) − c(0),0] for all s ∈ S,
customers will not buy quality ¯ v>0 for the price p(¯ v). Each customer prefers either to buy
minimum quality for the price c(0) or not to buy at all. Consequently, quality ¯ v>0 will
not be available in a stationary equilibrium. If this holds for all positive levels of quality,
i.e., if R(v,s) − ˆ p(v) < max[R(0,s) − c(0),0] for all s ∈ S and all v ∈ (0,1],t h e ni na n y
stationary equilibrium either only minimum quality is available or the good is not available
at all. Proposition 1 generalizes this observation to all equilibria.
Proposition 1. If for no positive level of quality v ∈ (0,1] customers are willing to pay the
price ˆ p(v), i.e., if R(v,s) − ˆ p(v) < max[R(0,s) − c(0),0] for all s ∈ S and all v ∈ (0,1],
then every Nash equilibrium in pure strategies has the property that positive quality is never
available in the market. Depending on preferences, the respective good is either available only
in minimum quality or, if R(0,s) <c(0) for all s ∈ S, is not available at all.
Under the assumption of Proposition 1, minimum quality v =0is available in the market
in each period if R(0,s) >c (0) for some s ∈ S, whereas if R(0,s) <c (0) for all s ∈ S
the respective good is never available (due to lack of demand). In the borderline case
R(0,s max)=c(0), in any period t minimum quality of the good may or may not be sold.
The intuition of Proposition 1 is as follows. By the proposition’s assumption customers
are not willing to pay the price ˆ p(v) that is necessary to provide the incentive to actually
produce quality v>0 when proﬁts per period are constant in time. Since positive quality can
be sold only for some price below ˆ p(v), an equilibrium requires that along the equilibrium
path proﬁts of a ﬁrm that sells v>0 in some period t increase in the future. Since proﬁts
can be positive in the future only if the respective ﬁrm provides again positive quality, the
argument feeds on itself and proﬁts have to increase ever more. In fact, it can be shown that
11with t →∞proﬁts must diverge. Since customers’ expenses are uniformly bounded, this is
not feasible and the proposition follows.
Even when customers are not willing to pay the prices ˆ p(v) for v ∈ (0,1], they may be
willing to pay the production cost c(v) < ˆ p(v). I np a r t i c u l a r ,i tm a yb et h ec a s et h a te v e r y
single customer prefers the highest feasible quality to all other alternatives when prices equal
marginal cost, i.e., max[R(v,s) − c(v),0] <R(1,s) − c(1) may hold for all v<1 and all
s ∈ S. If this is the case, only the highest feasible quality would be consumed in the ﬁrst
best, whereas due to asymmetric information either only minimum quality is available in
equilibrium or the good is not available at all.
Proposition 1 holds as well for the more general case where the payoﬀ function U (v,p,s)
is any function U :[ 0 ,1]×R+ ×S → R that is strictly decreasing in the price p.17 The proof
of Proposition 1 shows that if U [v, ˆ p(v),s] < max{U [0,c(0),s],0} for all v ∈ (0,1] and
all s ∈ S, then in every Nash equilibrium in pure strategies positive quality v>0 is never
a v a i l a b l ei nt h em a r k e t .M o r e o v e r ,P r o p o s i t i o n1d o e sn o td e p e n do nt h ed e t a i l so ft h eg a m e ,
such as simultaneous entry of ﬁrms, and extends to equilibria in mixed strategies.
5. Equilibrium Prices and Incentive Constraints
For the reasons explained in Section 2, we examine only stationary equilibria (in pure strate-
gies) in the rest of the paper. Along any stationary equilibrium path, all incumbents’ actions
are constant. However, deviating strategies are not constrained to be stationary. If we re-
strict for each ﬁrm the whole strategy set to stationary strategies, we get a new game, which
we call the restricted game. Although even for a stationary equilibrium of the original game
all strategies have to be considered as possible deviations, the following lemma shows that
it is actually suﬃcient to look only at stationary strategies.
Lemma 1. As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle that constitutes a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of the
restricted game is also a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of the original game.18
17If the parameter s is interpreted as “income” thought of as a Hicksian “composite commodity”, the
payoﬀ becomes U (v,p,s)=u(v,s− p), which frequently is further simpliﬁed to U (v,p,s)=w(v)(s − p),
as, e.g., in Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983).
18Obviously, the converse also holds: if a strategy proﬁle of stationary strategies constitutes a Nash
equilibrium of the original game, it also constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the restricted game.
12Obviously, in a stationary equilibrium incumbents have positive proﬁts, do not cheat and
do not exit. For each quality v ∈ [0,1] that is available in the market there can be only one
price p(v) a n di tm u s th o l dt h a tp(v) ≥ ˆ p(v), where ˆ p(v) is given by (3.2). Otherwise the
respective ﬁrm(s) would cheat. Below we will derive a condition that implies the equality
p(v)=ˆ p(v) for all intermediate quality levels v ∈ (0,1). Consequently, under this (suﬃcient
but non necessary) condition equilibrium prices of intermediate quality levels are completely
determined by the incentive constraints (3.3), whereas customer preferences and the distri-
bution of customer types only determine the quantities demanded, given (predetermined)
equilibrium prices. In addition, the price for minimum quality v =0is given by its cost
c(0). For maximum quality v =1the incentive constraint determines the price p(1) = ˆ p(1)
in two diﬀerent circumstances. One case occurs when the incentive cost
ρ
ϕγ is suﬃciently
l a r g et om a k et h ep r i c eˆ p(1) = c(1) +
ρ
ϕγ optimal (in the set {p | p ≥ ˆ p(1)} of “feasible”
prices) even for a ﬁrm that is the sole brand name in the market. The other case, explained
in the following paragraph, is the one where two or more brand names oﬀer quality v =1 .
If at least two brand names oﬀe rt h es a m eq u a l i t y¯ v>0, then Bertrand competition will
drive the price p(¯ v) to “the lowest possible value.” In the case of observable quality this
lowest possible value is the marginal cost c(¯ v). In contrast, when quality is unobservable,
t h el o w e s tp o s s i b l ev a l u ei sˆ p(¯ v) in any stationary equilibrium, since a brand name that
had announced quality ¯ v>0 and charges a price p(¯ v) < ˆ p(¯ v) will cheat. Because of
Assumption 3 (Customer Beliefs), customers will buy its product for a price below ˆ p(¯ v) only
if the price is c(0). Thus, if the ﬁrm charges a price p(¯ v) < ˆ p(¯ v), its proﬁt is zero, whereas
it is positive if p(¯ v)=ˆ p(¯ v). Consequently, whenever two or more brand names oﬀer the
same quality ¯ v it must hold that p(¯ v)=ˆ p(¯ v) in any stationary equilibrium.19, 20 Although it
is implausible that two or more brand names oﬀer the same intermediate quality v ∈ (0,1),
19As Klein and Leﬄer (1981, p. 625) put it “... the quality-assuring price is, in eﬀect, a minimum price
constraint ‘enforced’ by rational consumers.”
20Since brand names have no ﬁxed costs of production, every brand name that has incurred the entry cost
can stay in the market and guarantee itself a non-negative proﬁt per period. Consequently, it is impossible
that a brand name drives another brand name out of the market by undercutting ˆ p(¯ v). In the case where
(contrary to our model) brand names have ﬁxed costs of production, a diﬀerent argument gives the same
result. With ﬁxed costs, undercutting will trigger a war of attrition, and in wars of attrition the most plausible
equilibria are those in mixed strategies. Since this implies expected payoﬀs of zero, whereas cheating gives
strictly positive payoﬀs, the respective brand names will cheat. Because customers will recognize this,
undercutting is not proﬁtable.
13our analysis will show that for maximum quality v =1this may well be the case.
The additional amount of money that an agent of type s is willing to pay when the good
is of highest rather than of lowest possible quality is r(s) ≡ R(1,s) − R(0,s).I t w i l l b e
convenient to assume that types can be identiﬁed by this number,21 and we deﬁne types in
this way for the rest of the paper. In order to avoid a change in the notation of types from s
to r, we assume, without loss of generality, that r(s) was already the original way to deﬁne
types, i.e., that the identity s ≡ r(s) holds.
For the rest of the paper we assume that R(·,·) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and
that Rvs(·,·) > 0 for v>0, where subscripts of R(·,·) always denote the respective partial
derivatives. The assumption Rvs(·,·) > 0 is a single crossing condition and means that
types that have a higher utility diﬀerence between maximum and minimum quality also
have a higher willingness to pay for additional quality in general, i.e., have a higher marginal
willingness to pay for quality. Consequently, for any pair v00,v0 ∈ [0,1],v 00 >v 0, the diﬀerence
in willingness to pay, R(v00,s) − R(v0,s)=
R v00
v0 Rv (v,s)dv, is strictly increasing in s.22
Assumption 4 (Increasing Diﬀerences). Customers’ willingness to pay function R(·,·)
is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and Rvs(·,·) > 0 for v>0. That is, higher types have a
higher willingness to pay for additional quality.
We provide a suﬃcient condition for the incentive constraint to determine the price
charged by a ﬁrm that produces some quality v ∈ (0,1) below the maximum quality. Specif-
ically, we show that whenever it holds for all types s ∈ S that Rv (¯ v,s) > γ for some
¯ v ∈ (0,1),t h e np(¯ v)=ˆ p(¯ v). Consequently, if Rv (v,s) > γ for all v ∈ (0,1) and all s ∈ S,
then p(v)=ˆ p(v) for all v ∈ [0,1) since p(0) = ˆ p(0) = c(0) holds trivially. Substituting
for ˆ p(v) gives p(v)=c(v)+
ρ











ϕ > 1. Because of Rvs(·,·) > 0, the condition Rv (v,s) > γ for all v ∈ (0,1)
and all s ∈ S is equivalent to Rv (v,smin) > γ for all v ∈ (0,1). M o r e o v e r ,i ti sa l s oe q u i v a l e n t
to the condition that R(v,s) − c(v)=R(v,s) − c(0) − γv increases in v for all s ∈ S;o r ,
alternatively, that v0 >vimplies R(v0,s) − c(v0) >R(v,s) − c(v) for all v0,v∈ (0,1) and
21That is, if for two types, s and s0, it holds that R(1,s) − R(0,s)=R(1,s 0) − R(0,s 0), then s = s0.
22Except for points of inﬂection the converse also holds. Whenever for all v00,v0 ∈ [0,1],v 00 >v 0, the
diﬀerence R(v00,s) − R(v0,s)=
R v00
v0 Rv (v,s)dv, is strictly increasing in s for all s ∈ S,t h e nRvs(·,·) > 0
except for isolated points ˜ v ∈ [0,1]. This follows because if Rvs(v,s) ≤ 0 for all v ∈ [v0,v00] for some pair




v0 Rvs(v,s)dv ≤ 0.
14all s ∈ S. As a consequence, all agents prefer the highest feasible quality v =1to any other
quality (though not necessarily to abstention), if for all v ∈ [0,1] prices p(v) equal marginal
costs c(v).23
Proposition 2. If for some intermediate level of quality ¯ v ∈ (0,1) all customers’ marginal
willingness to pay for quality exceeds the “marginal cost of quality,” i.e., Rv (¯ v,·) > γ,t h e n
in any stationary equilibrium the price p(¯ v) for this level of quality is given by p(¯ v)=ˆ p(¯ v);
that is, the price for quality ¯ v is determined by the incentive constraint. If for all intermediate
levels of quality all customers’ marginal willingness to pay for quality exceeds the “marginal
cost of quality,” i.e., Rv (·,·) > γ for all v ∈ (0,1),t h e ni na n ys t a t i o n a r ye q u i l i b r i u mt h e
price p(v) is given by p(v)=ˆ p(v)=c(0) + αγv for each level of quality v ∈ [0,1) below
the highest possible level. Thus, for each positive level of quality v ∈ [0,1) below the highest
possible level the price is determined by the incentive constraint.24
Thus, if customers have a suﬃciently strong preference, relative to production cost, for
higher quality, then prices for all quality levels v ∈ [0,1) below 1 are determined by the sum
of production and incentive cost. Customer preferences, as long as they satisfy Rv (·,·) > γ
for v>0, and the distribution of customer types only determine the quantities demanded,
given the equilibrium prices (which are determined by the incentive constraints only). In
addition, whenever two or more ﬁrms oﬀer the highest possible quality v =1 , it follows from
23If R(·,·) is strictly concave in v (i.e., if Rvv (·,·) < 0), such a preference for the highest feasible quality
is even equivalent to Rv (·,·) > γ because then Rv (v,·) ≤ γ for some ¯ v ∈ (0,1) implies Rv (v,·) < γ for
all v ∈ (¯ v,1) and thus R(¯ v,·) − c(¯ v) >R(v,·) − c(v) for all v ∈ (¯ v,1). Notice that when R(·,·) is strictly
concave in v, R(v,s) − c(v)=R(v,s) − c(0) − γv, achieves an interior maximum where Rv (v,s)=γ,
provided such an interior maximum exists. Consequently, if R(·,·) is strictly concave in v and all customers
prefer the highest feasible quality v =1t oa n yo t h e rq u a l i t ya tp r i c e sp(v)=c(v),t h e ni tm u s th o l dt h a t
Rv (v,·) > γ for all v ∈ (0,1).
24It is suﬃcient that Rv (¯ v,s) > γ holds for the (unique) type s(¯ v) that solves Rv (¯ v,s) − Rv (0,s)=αγ¯ v
(thus s(¯ v) is the “indiﬀerent type” deﬁned by Rv (¯ v,s) − ˆ p(¯ v)=Rv (0,s) − c(0)), whenever such a type
exists. Because of Rvs(¯ v,s) > 0, this implies Rv (¯ v,s) > γ for all higher types s>s(¯ v), but for lower types
s<s(¯ v) it may hold that Rv (¯ v,s) ≤ γ. If a type s(¯ v) does not exist, either Rv (¯ v,s) − Rv (0,s) < αγ¯ v for
all s ∈ S and no type will demand quality ¯ v at the price ˆ p(¯ v), or Rv (¯ v,s) − Rv (0,s) > αγ¯ v for all s ∈ S
and then the assumption Rv (¯ v,·) > γ is needed. If for each ¯ v ∈ (0,1) the type s(¯ v) exists and satisﬁes
Rv (¯ v,s) > γ,t h e np(¯ v)=ˆ p(¯ v) for all ¯ v ∈ (0,1). Moreover, the proposition can be extended to the case
where the strict inequality in Rv (¯ v,s) > γ is replaced by the weak inequality.
15Bertrand competition that the price for maximum quality v =1is also determined by the
incentive constraint, i.e., p(1) = ˆ p(1).
6. Equilibrium With Convex Willingness to Pay
The shape of customers’ willingness to pay functions R(v,s), speciﬁcally whether they are
convex or concave with respect to quality v,h a sas i g n i ﬁcant eﬀect on the equilibrium. We
restrict our analysis to the two cases where these functions are either convex or concave with
respect to quality v for all s ∈ S.25 First, we analyze the case where customers’ willingness
to pay R(v,s) is convex in v, i.e., Rvv (·,·) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S. That includes, in particular, the
subcase where R(·,·) is linear in v. We show that in this convex case at most the two extreme
quality levels, v =0and v =1 , are available in the market. If two or more ﬁrms can cover
their entry cost, all will oﬀer quality v =1for the price ˆ p(1).26 A plausible assumption is
that higher types are willing to pay more for maximum quality, that is, R(1,·) is increasing
in s. In this case, the interval S =[ smin,s max] can be partitioned into a point ¯ s and the
two subintervals, [smin, ¯ s) and s ∈ (¯ s,smax], such that all types s ∈ (¯ s,smax] consume quality
v =1 , whereas all types s ∈ [smin, ¯ s) either abstain from consuming the good or consume
quality v =0 . Whenever ¯ s ∈ (smin,s max), customer type ¯ s is indiﬀerent between consuming
quality v =1and the better one of the alternatives abstention and consumption of quality
v =0 .
Proposition 3. Assume that customers’ willingness to pay R(·,s) is convex in v, i.e.,
Rvv (·,s) ≥ 0, for all s ∈ S. Then in every stationary equilibrium at most the quality levels
v =0and v =1are available in the market. If the market can accommodate two or more
ﬁrms that oﬀer positive quality, the only equilibrium in stationary strategies is that all those
ﬁrms oﬀer v =1for the price p(1) = ˆ p(1) = c(0) + αγ. If customers’ willingness to pay
for maximum quality R(1,·) is strictly increasing in type s, there exists a customer type
25Some customers will never demand positive quality at prices p(v) ≥ ˆ p(v) and, thus, the shape of their
willingness to pay functions–whether they are convex, concave or neither–is irrelevant. Speciﬁcally, if for
ac u s t o m e rt y p e˜ s it holds that R(v,˜ s) − ˆ p(v) < max[R(0, ˜ s) − c(0),0] for all v ∈ (0,1], it follows from
the incentive constraint (3.3) that this type will never demand positive quality. Thus we could limit any
assumption on the shape of R(·,·) to “relevant” types.
26S i n c ew eh a v en o r m a l i z e dt h ep o p u l a t i o nt oh a v em e a s u r e1, t h ee n t r yc o s th a st ob em e a s u r e dr e l a t i v e
t ot h es i z eo ft h ep o p u l a t i o n .
16¯ s ∈ S such that all types s ∈ [smin, ¯ s) either abstain from consuming the good or consume
quality v =0 , and all types s ∈ (¯ s,smax] consume quality v =1 . Provided two or more
ﬁrms oﬀer positive quality, the (indiﬀerent) customer type ¯ s decreases strictly with α for
¯ s ∈ (smin,s max).
Interestingly, more demand may reduce the price p(1). With weak demand only one
brand name is able to cover the entry cost, and in general a (monopoly) price pM (1) > ˆ p(1)
will be optimal for the single brand name. In contrast, with stronger demand two or more
brand names are able to cover the entry cost and thus the equilibrium price is pB (1) =
ˆ p(1) <p 0 (1) because of Bertrand competition. This gives the following corollary.
Corollary 1. If customers’ willingness to pay R(·,s) is convex in v for all s ∈ S (i.e.,
Rvv (·,·) ≥ 0), then an increase in some or all customers’ willingness to pay for quality v =1
may reduce the equilibrium price of quality v =1 .
Is the equilibrium outcome constrained eﬃcient in the sense that a planner who does
not have more information than the customers and cannot inﬂuence the parameters of the
model, cannot improve the outcome? In general not, since the planner would allow only
one brand name to enter because of the positive entry cost. However, if in the stationary
equilibrium there is only one brand name but the price for quality v =1is nevertheless ˆ p(1),
then the equilibrium outcome is constrained eﬃcient. That is, the equilibrium outcome is
constrained eﬃcient with respect to quality choice and prices, provided p(1) = ˆ p(1). This
holds because like the market the planner has to provide incentives for the ﬁrms not to cheat.
Thus, when setting prices the planner is constrained by the incentive constraints (3.3). Of
course, policy may increase the detection parameter ϕ (at some cost) and therefore reduce
prices (and ﬁrm’s proﬁts). However, the lack of intermediate qualities v ∈ (0,1) in the
market is constrained eﬃcient even regardless of the detection parameter ϕ. This follows
because linearity of unit cost c(v) and convexity of willingness to pay R(v,s) in quality v
imply that for any value of the detection parameter ϕ consumer welfare and total proﬁts
can be maximized with just the two qualities v =0and v =1 .E v e nt h eﬁrst-best can be
achieved without any intermediate quality levels being available in the market.
It is useful to compare our model with one that is identical except that quality is observ-
able and unit production cost of quality v ∈ [0,1] is given by c(v)=c(0)+αγv.T h a ti s ,f o r
the comparison we consider the market for an inspection good that has (no incentive costs
17but) production costs which are identical to the sum of production and incentive costs of the
experience good considered so far. In all other respects, in particular regarding preferences
and entry cost, the two models are identical. At least when customers’ willingness to pay
R(·,s) is strictly convex in v (i.e., Rvv (·,s) > 0), the proof of Proposition 3 can be applied to
this case as well, although with a slight modiﬁcation.27 It follows that only one brand name
can be in the market, because with two or more brand names all will oﬀer v =1for the price
ˆ p(1) = c(0) + αγ that equals unit cost and gives zero proﬁts. Since the brand names could
n o tc o v e rt h ep o s i t i v ee n t r yc o s t ,o n l yo n eb r a n dn a m ec a nb ei nt h em a r k e ti nas t a t i o n a r y
equilibrium. The single brand name will oﬀer quality v =1for a price p(1) > ˆ p(1) and
customers will be worse oﬀ t h a ni nt h ec a s ew h e r et o t a lu n i tc o s tc(v)=c(0)+αγv consists
of production cost c(0) + γv and incentive cost (α − 1)γv =
ρ
ϕγv.
7. Equilibrium With Concave Willingness to Pay
In this section, we consider the case where each customer’s willingness to pay R(·,·) is
concave in v, i.e., Rvv (·,·) ≤ 0. Whenever R(·,·) is linear in v the results of the previous
section apply, and this is also true for some degenerate cases (e.g., when R(·,s) is non-linear
only for types s that will never demand positive quality). If R(·,·) is strictly concave in v,
the model becomes similar to a location model.28. Depending on customer preferences, the
distribution of customer types, and other parameters, many outcomes are possible. Moreover,
because of the discontinuity associated with Bertrand competition an equilibrium need not
exist.
We provide suﬃcient conditions for a lack of variety in the sense that no or at best
relatively few ﬁrms oﬀer an intermediate quality level even though willingness to pay is
concave. The intuition for this result is that with a skewed type distribution it is more
27The only diﬀerence is that when quality ¯ v<1 and price p(¯ v) are increased to v =1and p(1) =
p(¯ v)+( 1− ¯ v)αγ, respectively, proﬁt per customer p(1) − c(0) − αγ = p(¯ v)+( 1− ¯ v)αγ − c(0) − αγ =
p(¯ v) − c(0) − αγ¯ v does not increase but remains constant.
28If Rvv (·,·) < 0 and prices are given by p(v)=ˆ p(v)=c(0) + αγv for all v ∈ [0,1],R (v,s) − p(v)
has an interior maximum where Rv (v,s)=αγ, provided an interior maximum exists. If an interior
maximum does not exist, either R(0,s) ≤ αγ and argmax[R(v,s) − p(v)] = 0, or R(1,s) ≥ αγ and
argmax[R(v,s) − p(v)] = 1. Thus, we can deﬁne the “location” v(s) of customer s to be the solution of
Rv (v,s)=αγ if such a solution exists, to be v(s)=0if R(0,s) ≤ αγ, and to be v(s)=1if R(1,s) ≥ αγ.
However, if R(v(s),s) < ˆ p(v(s)), type s prefers not to buy the product at all.
18proﬁtable to share the high price market for maximum quality with competitors than to
oﬀer an intermediate quality level. Since the price for maximum quality cannot fall below
ˆ p(1) >c(1), the eﬀect of competition is limited. Provided two or more ﬁrms already oﬀer
maximum quality, entry into this market does not decrease the price although it exceeds
marginal cost. Thus, the incentive to diﬀerentiate is signiﬁcantly reduced. If, given the
entry cost, the overall market for positive quality levels can accommodate only few ﬁrms, all
(or most) incumbents may oﬀer maximum quality.
For the two propositions of this section we employ the plausible assumption that cus-
tomers’ willingness to pay for maximum quality v =1is strictly increasing in type, i.e.,
Rs (1,·) > 0. If at least two ﬁrms oﬀer quality v =1 , Bertrand competition implies p(1) =
ˆ p(1).S i n c e p(v) ≥ ˆ p(v) for all v ∈ [0,1], at the price p(1) = ˆ p(1) every type s ∈ S that
satisﬁes the two conditions Rv (1,s) ≥ αγ and R(1,s) > ˆ p(1) demands quality v =1 , re-
gardless of the availability of other quality levels. Because of Assumption 4 and Rs (1,·) > 0,
if some type s demands quality v =1 , every type s0 >sdoes so as well. Consequently, there
exists a type s1 ∈ S such that if p(1) = ˆ p(1), all s>s 1 demand maximum quality v =1
regardless of the availability of other quality levels and their prices p(v) ≥ ˆ p(v),w h e r e a sf o r
all types s<s 1 this is not the case. These types s<s 1 either prefer some quality v ∈ [0,1)
for the price p(v)=ˆ p(v) or prefer not to buy at all. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne s1 in the following
way. If the two conditions Rv (1,s) ≥ αγ and R(1,s) ≥ ˆ p(1) have a solution s0 such that
at least one inequality holds as equality, then s1 = s0. If such a solution does not exist but
it holds that Rv (1,s min) > αγ and R(1,s min) > ˆ p(1),t h e ns1 = smin. Otherwise, for each
s ∈ S at least one of the two inequalities, Rv (1,s) ≥ αγ and R(1,s) ≥ ˆ p(1), is violated and
we deﬁne s1 = smax. It is easy to show that at the price p(1) = ˆ p(1) demand for maximum
quality v =1is bounded from below by 1 − F (s1), regardless of the availability of other
quality levels and their (incentive compatible) prices.29
Next we deﬁne a type s0 such that every “lower” type s<s 0 (which exists only if
s0 >s min) never demands positive quality. Because of p(v) ≥ ˆ p(v)=p(0) + αγv for
all v ∈ [0,1] and Rvv (·,·) ≤ 0,at y p es with Rv (0,s) < αγ will always prefer minimum
quality v =0to any positive quality since for every v>0 it holds that R(v,s) − p(v) <
R(0,s)+αγv − ˆ p(v)=R(0,s)−p(0). If Rv (0,s)=αγ h a sau n i q u es o l u t i o ns00, we deﬁne
s0 by s0 = s00, and if it has more than one solution, let s0 be the minimum of those. If
29The proof of Proposition 4 in the Appendix contains a rigorous derivation.
19Rv (0,s)=αγ has no solution, either Rv (0,s min) > αγ (which implies Rv (0,s) > αγ for
all s)o rRv (0,s max) < αγ (which implies Rv (0,s) < αγ for all s). We deﬁne s0 = smin if
Rv (0,s min) > αγ,a n ds0 = smax if Rv (0,s max) < αγ. It follows that at most 1 − F (s0)
customers will ever demand positive quality. Moreover, if quality v =1is available for the
price p(1) = ˆ p(1), demand for intermediate quality levels v ∈ (0,1) is bounded from above
by F (s1) − F (s0).
For reasons that will become clear below, we are interested in the situation where F (s1)−
F (s0) is smaller than 1−F (s1). This will be the case whenever prices ˆ p(v) are relatively high,
the distribution of types is skewed to the right (which his consistent with the distributions
of income and of wealth both being skewed to the right), and the willingness to pay is not
too concave in v. Under these conditions F (s1) − F (s0) will be smaller than 1 − F (s1).
Thus, for many cases 1−F (s1) >F(s1)−F (s0) seems a plausible assumption. In fact, the
diﬀerence between the two expressions may be signiﬁcant, and thus the ratio
1−F(s1)
F(s1)−F(s0) may
be considerably larger than 1.L e tλ denote
1−F(s1)
1−F(s0), which is the probability that conditional





If for all intermediate levels of quality all customers’ marginal willingness to pay for
quality exceeds the “marginal cost of quality”, i.e., Rv (·,·) > γ for all v ∈ (0,1),t h e n
p(v)=ˆ p(v) for all [0,1) because of Proposition 2. Consequently, proﬁt per customer is
maximized at v =1 , since p(1)−c(1) ≥ ˆ p(1)−c(1) = (α − 1)γ > (α − 1)γv =ˆ p(v)−c(v)
for all v ∈ [0,1). As an illustration consider the case 1 − F (s1)=2[ F (s1) − F (s0)], i.e.,
λ = 2
3.
If there are N =2brand names in the market and λ = 2
3,i tc a n n o tb eas t a t i o n a r y
equilibrium that each oﬀers some (identical or diﬀerent) intermediate quality level, as the
following argument shows. Since their total demand is at most 1 − F (s0), their combined
proﬁt per period is less than [1 − F (s0)](α − 1)γ. Consequently, at least one brand level
has a proﬁt per period that is less than 1






(α − 1)γ =
3
4 [1 − F (s1)](α − 1)γ < [1 − F (s1)](α − 1)γ. If the respective brand name oﬀers quality
v =1for the price p(1) = ˆ p(1), its proﬁt per period exceeds [1 − F (s1)][p(1) − c(1)] ≥
[1 − F (s1)](α − 1)γ. Thus, the respective brand name can increase its payoﬀ by switching
to quality v =1 . Moreover, it cannot be a stationary equilibrium either that one brand name
oﬀers an intermediate quality level v ∈ (0,1) and the other oﬀers maximum quality v =1for
the price p(1) = ˆ p(1). T h er e a s o ni st h a tt h ep r o ﬁt per period of the brand name that oﬀers
20v<1 is less than [F (s1) − F (s0)](α − 1)γv<1
2 [1 − F (s1)](α − 1)γ. Hence the respective
brand name is better oﬀ,i fi to ﬀers maximum quality v =1as well. This argument also
shows that for λ = 2
3 and N =2it is always an equilibrium (assuming that the entry cost
η is consistent with N =2in equilibrium) that both brand names oﬀer maximum quality
v =1 , which implies that the price is p(1) = ˆ p(1) because of Bertrand competition. In
addition, it can also be an equilibrium that one brand name oﬀers an intermediate quality
level v ∈ (0,1) for the price p(v)=ˆ p(v) and the other oﬀers maximum quality for some
price p(1) > ˆ p(1), but this requires quite speciﬁc assumptions and does not hold generally.30
If there are N =3brand names in the market and λ = 2
3,a tl e a s t2 brand names will
oﬀer quality v =1and thus the price is p(1) = ˆ p(1). The reason is as follows. If all 3 ﬁrms
oﬀer intermediate quality, at least one has a proﬁtp e rp e r i o db e l o w1
3 [1 − F (s0)](α − 1)γ <
1
2 [1 − F (s0)](α − 1)γ < [1 − F (s1)](α − 1)γ (the second inequality has been derived above)
and thus has a higher payoﬀ,i fi to ﬀers maximum quality for the price p(1) = ˆ p(1).I f
two ﬁrms oﬀer intermediate quality and the third oﬀers maximum quality for some price
p(1) > ˆ p(1), at least one ﬁrm oﬀering intermediate quality has a proﬁt per period below
1
2 [1 − F (s0)](α − 1)γ < [1 − F (s1)](α − 1)γ a n dt h u si sb e t t e ro ﬀ,i fi to ﬀers maximum
quality for the price p(1) = ˆ p(1).I f t w o ﬁrms oﬀer intermediate quality and the third
oﬀers maximum quality for the price p(1) = ˆ p(1), at least one ﬁrm oﬀering intermediate
quality has a proﬁtp e rp e r i o db e l o w1
2 [F (s1) − F (s0)](α − 1)γ = 1
4 [1 − F (s1)](α − 1)γ <
1
2 [1 − F (s1)](α − 1)γ, and thus, again, it is better oﬀ,i fo ﬀers maximum quality for the
price p(1) = ˆ p(1).
If there are N =4brand names in the market and λ = 2
3, a similar argument shows
that at least 3 brand names will oﬀer quality v =1 . Thus, in the example brand names tend
to provide maximum quality rather than intermediate quality. The following proposition
30Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrm oﬀering v<1 for the price p(v)=ˆ p(v) must make a higher proﬁt than the one that
oﬀers v =1for some price p1 > ˆ p(1) because otherwise the former could increase its payoﬀ by undercutting
the latter (notice that the ﬁrm oﬀering v =1cannot undercut its competing brand name because v<1 is
sold for the lowest possible price p(v)=ˆ p(v) ). Moreover, if the ﬁrm that provides v<1 oﬀers instead
maximum quality v =1for some price p2 ∈ [ˆ p(1),p 1) it gets the whole market for quality v =1and its
only eﬀective competitors are no names oﬀering minimum quality v =0for the price c(0). Nevertheless
the respective brand name’s proﬁt must not exceed the one it gets from oﬀering intermediate quality v<1
for the price ˆ p(v). These necessary (but not suﬃcient) conditions illustrate that only under very speciﬁc
circumstances an equilibrium where one of the two brand names oﬀers intermediate quality exists.
21generalizes this observation.
Proposition 4. Consider the case where each customer’s willingness to pay is concave
in v, i.e., Rvv (·,·) ≤ 0. Assume that customers’ willingness to pay for maximum quality
is strictly increasing in type s, i.e., Rs (1,·) > 0; and that for all intermediate levels of
quality all customers’ marginal willingness to pay for quality exceeds the “marginal cost of
quality,” i.e., Rv (·,·) > γ for all v ∈ (0,1). Then in every stationary equilibrium with
N ≥ 1
λ +1brand names in the market (which implies N ≥ 2) the price for maximum quality
v =1is p(1) = ˆ p(1), and the number of brand names that oﬀer maximum quality is at least






brand names in the market (which implies λ ≥ 3
4)a l lN brand names in
the market oﬀer maximum quality v =1for the price p(1) = ˆ p(1).32
The number of brand names that oﬀer maximum quality will frequently exceed its lower
bound λ(N +1 )−1 considerably. Without more speciﬁc assumptions on the willingness to
pay functions it is impossible to derive tight bounds on demand for maximum and intermedi-
ate quality, respectively. In most cases the term [1 − F (s1)] will signiﬁcantly underestimate
demand for quality v =1 , while simultaneously the term [F (s1) − F (s0)] will signiﬁcantly
overestimate demand for intermediate qualities. Moreover, since intermediate quality v<1
can be arbitrarily close to 1, t h ef a c tt h a tp r o ﬁts per customer decrease with quality v cannot
be exploited. Therefore, the proposition’s result that brand names will provide exclusively
or at least predominantly maximum quality canb ee x p e c t e dt oh o l df o rc o n s i d e r a b l yl o w e r
values of λ =
1−F(s1)
1−F(s0) than suggested by Proposition 4.
Under the conditions of Proposition 4 brand names tend to provide maximum quality
v =1rather than an intermediate quality v ∈ (0,1). For example, if λ = 2
3, in a stationary
equilibrium where N =2no intermediate quality will be available in the market. But even
when there are many brand names in the market, only relatively few intermediate qualities
31Notice that the inequality n>λ(N +1 )−1 is equivalent to n+1
N+1 > λ, which gives a lower bound to the
“modiﬁed share” of ﬁrms that oﬀer maximum quality.
32All stationary equilibria where N ≥ 2 brand names are in the market and oﬀer maximum quality, are
equivalent from the customers’ point of view. They diﬀer only with respect to the identity of the ﬁrms.
All stationary equilibria where N =1brand name is in the market and oﬀers maximum quality, are also
equivalent from the customers’ point of view, but if the sole brand name charges a price p(1) > ˆ p(1)
customers are worse oﬀ than in stationary equilibria with N ≥ 2 brand names oﬀering maximum quality.
22will be available. For example, if λ = 2
3, in a stationary equilibrium where N =8at most
2 brand names will oﬀer intermediate quality levels, whereas at least 6 brand names oﬀer
maximum quality. In fact, in most cases λ = 2
3 and N =8will imply that 7 brand names
oﬀer maximum quality and only one oﬀers some intermediate level.33 Thus, although some
intermediate quality levels may be oﬀered when customer’s willingness to pay is concave in
v, they will be ineﬃciently few. Moreover, since proﬁt per customer ˆ p(v)−c(v)=( α − 1)γv
increases in quality v, the intermediate quality levels that are actually available will be biased
towards maximum quality v =1 . In contrast, in the second-best every brand name would
oﬀer a diﬀerent level of quality and the diﬀerent quality levels would be spread out over the
interval (0,1].
The assumption that for all positive levels of quality all customers’ marginal willingness
to pay for quality exceeds the “marginal cost of quality” is used only to make sure that
proﬁts per customer are maximal at v =1 , which follows from the assumption’s implication
that p(v)=ˆ p(v) for all [0,1). Even when customers’ marginal willingness to pay for quality
is lower than required by the assumption, proﬁt per customer may well be maximal at v =1
because optimal prices for intermediate quality levels may not exceed ˆ p(v) signiﬁcantly, if at
all. And if the optimal price for an intermediate quality level v does exceed ˆ p(v) signiﬁcantly,
this may lead to low demand and the diﬀerence in proﬁt per customer may be compensated
by a higher number of customers at v =1 . Whenever the distribution of types is suﬃciently
skewed to the right, we can expect brand names to concentrate at maximum quality v =1
and not to spread out over intermediate quality levels, as would be eﬃcient.
As pointed out above, because of the discontinuity associated with Bertrand competition
an equilibrium need not exist. Proposition 4 circumvents this issue. In the rest of this
section we address this problem and provide a suﬃcient condition for existence of a stationary
equilibrium where all brand names in the market oﬀer maximum quality v =1 . In the proof
of Proposition 3 it is shown that if customers’ willingness to pay for maximum quality is
strictly increasing in type s, i.e., if Rs (1,·) > 0, there exists a unique type ¯ s ∈ S that
solves the equation R(1, ¯ s) − ˆ p(1) = max[R(0, ¯ s) − c(0),0], provided R(1,s max) − p(1) ≥
33This follows from the fact that the bounds used for the proof of Proposition 4 are not tight, as explained
in the previous paragraph. If N is suﬃciently large, such that more than 1 brand name may oﬀer intermediate
quality (as with N =8 ), there is an additional loss of tightness: the proof does not exploit the fact that the
proﬁto ft h eleast proﬁtable ﬁrm among several ﬁrms that all oﬀer intermediate qualities will be below the
average proﬁto ft h o s eﬁrms.
23max[R(0,s max) − c(0),0] and R(1,s min)−p(1) ≤ max[R(0,s min) − c(0),0]. Existence and
uniqueness of the type ¯ s does not depend on the convexity of R(·,·) in v that is assumed
for Proposition 3. If R(1,s max) − p(1) < max[R(0,s max) − c(0),0] type ¯ s is deﬁned as
¯ s = smax,a n di fR(1,s min)−p(1) > max[R(0,s min) − c(0),0] type ¯ s is deﬁned as ¯ s = smin.
All types s ∈ [smin, ¯ s) prefer to buy quality v =0for the price c(0) or not to buy at all
to buying quality v =1for the price ˆ p(1), whereas all types s ∈ (¯ s,smax] prefer to buy
quality v =1for the price ˆ p(1) to buying quality v =0for the price c(0) and to not
buying at all. Consequently, if only the extreme quality levels v =0and v =1are available
in the market and prices are p(0) = c(0) and p(1) = ˆ p(1), demand for quality v =1
is given by 1 − F (¯ s). If N ≥ 2 brand names are in the market and all oﬀer v =1 , the
price is p(1) = ˆ p(1) and the proﬁt per period of each brand name is 1
N [1 − F (¯ s)](α − 1)γ.
Under the assumptions of Proposition 4, if one of the brand names deviates and oﬀers some
intermediate quality v ∈ (0,1), its proﬁt per period is less than [F (s1) − F (s0)](α − 1)γ.
Thus, if [F (s1) − F (s0)](α − 1)γ ≤ 1
N [1 − F (¯ s)](α − 1)γ,n oﬁrm will deviate.
In any stationary equilibrium each brand name in the market must be able to cover the
entry cost η, which means that its proﬁt per period must be at least ηρ (where ρ denotes the
discount or interest rate). The constellation where N ≥ 2 brand names are in the market
and all oﬀer maximum quality v =1for the price p(1) = ˆ p(1), is a stationary equilibrium if
three conditions hold: (i) each brand name in the market is at least able to cover the entry
cost, (ii) an additional brand name, if it entered, could at best just cover the entry cost
and thus cannot get a positive payoﬀ, and (iii) no brand name in the market can increase
its proﬁt per period by deviating from maximum quality v =1to some lower quality level.
The following proposition provides suﬃcient conditions (a) for the existence of a stationary
equilibrium where all brand names in the market oﬀer maximum quality, and (b) for the
conclusion that in every stationary equilibrium all brand names in the market oﬀer maximum
quality.
Proposition 5. Consider the case where each customer’s willingness to pay is concave
in v, i.e., Rvv (·,·) ≤ 0. Assume that customers’ willingness to pay for maximum quality
is strictly increasing in type s, i.e., Rs (1,·) > 0; and that for all intermediate levels of
quality all customers’ marginal willingness to pay for quality exceeds the “marginal cost of
quality,” i.e., Rv (·,·) > γ for all v ∈ (0,1). If the two conditions 1
N+1 [1 − F (¯ s)](α − 1)γ ≤
ηρ ≤ 1
N [1 − F (¯ s)](α − 1)γ and [F (s1) − F (s0)](α − 1)γ ≤ ηρ are both satisﬁed for some
24N ≥ 2, there exists a stationary equilibrium where N brand names are in the market and
all oﬀer v =1for the price p(1) = ˆ p(1). Whenever, in addition, the ﬁrst condition implies
N ≥ 3,a l lN brand names in the market oﬀer v =1for the price p(1) = ˆ p(1) in every
stationary equilibrium.
If Proposition 5 holds, the market for each speciﬁc intermediate quality level ¯ v ∈ (0,1) is
t o o“ t h i n ”( f o rh i g h¯ v) or too unproﬁtable (for low ¯ v) to justify entry, given the availability
of minimum and maximum quality for the prices p(0) = c(0) and p(1) = ˆ p(1), respectively.
Although many customers may prefer some intermediate quality, every particular level of
intermediate quality would attract only a limited number of customers or generate only an
insigniﬁcant proﬁt per customer, and thus would result in an insuﬃcient proﬁtr e l a t i v et o
the entry cost. Since for all v ∈ (0,1) the price is ˆ p(v), proﬁt per customer is proportional
to v, and consequently for small v the associated proﬁt is low even when demand is high.
Existence of an equilibrium with one or more ﬁrms oﬀering intermediate quality levels
depends on details of customers’ willingness to pay functions and of the distribution of
types. The general level of our analysis with respect to these concepts prevents us from
further examining this issue.
8. Conclusions
In many markets with asymmetric information about product quality, e.g., in some markets
for agricultural produce and food products, quality is generally low, and high quality is
either impossible to ﬁnd or extremely expensive. Motivated by this casual observation, we
considered a model of vertical product diﬀerentiation where before purchase the respective
good’s quality is unobservable to buyers, a continuum of quality levels is technologically
feasible, and minimum quality is supplied under competitive conditions. After purchase the
true quality of the good is revealed with positive probability. For each feasible quality level,
except for the minimum, the price must exceed marginal cost in order to provide incentives
for the respective ﬁrm not to produce lower quality than announced. Our analysis shows that
if customers have a strong preference for high quality relative to production cost, equilibrium
prices are completely determined by incentive constraints for all quality levels, except for the
maximum. Consequently, for those quality levels customer preferences and the distribution
of customer types only determine the quantities demanded, given equilibrium prices, but not
25the prices themselves. Moreover, if the information problem is suﬃciently severe, no positive
quality is available in the market even though all customers may prefer maximal quality to
any other quality when each quality level is sold for a price that is equal to its unit cost.
The shape of customers’ willingness to pay functions–whether they are convex or concave
w i t hr e s p e c tt oq u a l i t y – h a sas i g n i ﬁcant eﬀect on the equilibrium. When each customer’s
willingness to pay for quality is convex with respect to quality, at most two levels of quality,
the lowest and the highest one among the technologically feasible levels, are available in the
market, and this is constrained eﬃcient. When customers’ willingness to pay for quality is
concave (but not linear), the model becomes similar to a location model and an equilibrium
may not even exist. Existence of an equilibrium and its properties depend on details of
customers’ willingness to pay functions and the distribution of types. We investigated the
case where the type distribution is skewed to the right and demonstrated that under plausible
conditions ﬁrms that oﬀer above minimum quality tend to concentrate at maximum quality
v =1rather than to spread out over all above minimum quality levels, as would be eﬃcient.
Only few ﬁrms, if any, will oﬀer intermediate quality levels. Indeed, we provided suﬃcient
conditions for the existence of an equilibrium where all brand names in the market oﬀer
maximum quality, and for the uniqueness of this equilibrium outcome.
26Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 : The proof is by contradiction. Assume that there exists a
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies where in some period t some ﬁrm oﬀers some quality
vt > 0 at a price pt such that sales xt are positive. The ﬁrm will not cheat along the
equilibrium path (and thus we need not distinguish between announced and actual quality
levels). Because of this and because we consider only pure strategies, the respective ﬁrm’s
sales are deterministic along the equilibrium path. Denote equilibrium sales by xτ ≥ 0,
equilibrium prices by pτ ≥ 0, and equilibrium quality levels by vτ ∈ [0,1], τ ∈ {t,t +1 ,...}.




s+1−τ [ps − c(vs)]xs = δ[pτ − c(vτ)]xτ + δVτ+1. First, we derive the incentive
constraint that prevents the ﬁrm from cheating (only) in period t. If the ﬁrm follows its
equilibrium strategy, Vt = δ[pt − c(vt)]xt +δVt+1. If it cheats in period t, but not thereafter
its expected payoﬀ from period t onwards is δ [pt − c(0)]xt+(1− ϕ)δVt+1. For the ﬁrm not to
cheat in period t, it must hold that δ[pt − c(vt)]xt +δVt+1 ≥ δ[pt − c(0)]xt +(1− ϕ)δVt+1,
and thus ϕδVt+1 ≥ δ[c(vt) − c(0)]xt = δγvtxt or Vt+1 ≥ 1
ϕγvtxt > 0, where positivity
follows from vt > 0 and xt > 0. By assumption, R(v,s) − ˆ p(v) < max[R(0,s) − c(0),0]
for all v ∈ (0,1] and all s ∈ S. Hence there exists a positive function κ :( 0 ,1] → R++ such
that max[R(0,s) − c(0),0] − [R(v,s) − ˆ p(v)] > κ(v) > 0 for all v ∈ (0,1] and all s ∈ S.
Therefore, since vt > 0 and xt > 0, pt < ˆ p(vt) − κ(vt)=c(vt)+
ρ
ϕγvt − κ(vt) because for
pt ≥ ˆ p(vt)−κ(vt) and vt > 0 sales xt are zero. Thus, pt −c(vt) <
ρ
ϕγvt −κ(vt). Because of
this and 1
ϕγvtxt ≤ Vt+1,V t = δ[pt − c(vt)]xt+δVt+1 < δ
ρ
ϕγvtxt−δκ(vt)xt+δVt+1 ≤ ρδVt+1+
δVt+1 −δκ(vt)xt = Vt+1 −δκ(vt)xt, i.e., Vt+1 −Vt > δκ(vt)xt > 0. The preceding argument
can be applied to any period τ. Consequently, whenever vτxτ > 0 (which is equivalent to
vτ > 0 and xτ > 0)f o rs o m eτ,V τ+1 − Vτ > δκ(vτ)xτ > 0. Consider next the case where
vτxτ =0 , i.e., where vτ =0or xτ =0 , or both. Notice that if vτ =0and xτ > 0, then
pτ = c(0) and thus pτ − c(vτ)=0 . From Vτ = δ[pτ − c(vτ)]xτ + δVτ+1 and 1
δ =1+ρ we
get Vτ+1 =( 1+ρ)Vτ − [pτ − c(vτ)]xτ. Therefore, vτxτ =0implies Vτ+1 − Vτ = ρVτ. We
know that Vt+1 > 0. If vt+1xt+1 =0 , t h ep r e v i o u sa r g u m e n tg i v e sVt+2 >V t+1. Moreover, we
have shown that vτxτ > 0 for any τ implies Vτ+1 − Vτ > δκ(vτ)xτ > 0, hence vt+1xt+1 > 0
implies Vt+2 − Vt+1 > δκ(vt+1)xt+1 > 0. It follows that Vt+2 >V t+1 regardless of vt+1 and
xt+1. Repeating this argument shows that Vτ+1 >V τ for all τ ∈ {t,t +1 ,...}.
27By assumption, total expenditures pτxτ are uniformly bounded. Consequently, per period
proﬁts [pτ − c(vτ)]xτ ≤ pτxτ are bounded by some number M and thus Vτ, τ ∈ {t,t +1 ,...},
is bounded by M/ρ. Therefore, the (increasing) sequence {Vτ}
∞
t must converge to some ¯ V.
Together with Vt+1 > 0 this implies that there exists a suﬃciently large T>tsuch that for
all τ ∈ {T,T +1 ,...} it holds that
ρ
2Vt+1 >V τ+1 − Vτ and thus
ρ
2Vt+1 >V τ+1 − Vτ = ρVτ −
[pτ − c(vτ)]xτ ≥ ρVt+1−[pτ − c(vτ)]xτ, which gives [pτ − c(vτ)]xτ >
ρ
2Vt+1 > 0 (in addition,







Moreover, [pτ − c(vτ)]xτ > 0 implies pτ >c (0) > 0 and thus, because expenditures pτxτ
are uniformly bounded, xτ < ¯ x for some ¯ x.T o g e t h e rw i t h[pτ − c(vτ)]xτ >
ρ
2Vt+1 this gives




2¯ xVt+1 > 0. In addition, 0 <p τ − c(vτ) < ˆ p(vτ) − c(vτ)=
ρ
ϕγvτ
implies [pτ − c(vτ)] → 0 for vτ → 0. Therefore, there exists a ¯ v>0 such that vτ > ¯ v for all
τ ∈ {T,T +1 ,...}.S i n c e vτ > ¯ v>0 for all τ ∈ {T,T +1 ,...}, κ(vτ) > ¯ κ for some ¯ κ > 0
for all τ ∈ {T,T +1 ,...}. Finally, vτxτ > 0 implies Vτ+1 − Vτ > δκ(vτ)xτ > δ¯ κ
ϕ
2γVt+1 > 0
for all τ ∈ {T,T +1 ,...}, and thus the sequence {Vτ}
∞
t cannot converge to some ¯ V.This
contradiction proves the proposition.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :Since the respective strategy proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium of the re-
stricted game, the incentive constraints for always actually producing the announced quality
are satisﬁed. Otherwise customers would not buy the respective ﬁrm’s product for a price
above c(0),t h eﬁrm’s proﬁt would be zero and it would not have entered the market (since
it has a positive entry cost). In addition, since all competitors’ actions are constant in time,
each ﬁrm’s (constant) choice of quality and price maximizes in each individual period its per
period proﬁt, given all other incumbents’ qualities and prices. Consequently, no incumbent
can improve her payoﬀ b yd e v i a t i n gt oad i ﬀerent (stationary or non-stationary) strategy
with respect to quality and price. Moreover, each incumbent makes in each period a con-
stant positive proﬁtt h a tm u s te x c e e dt h ee n t r yc o s tt i m e st h ed i s c o u n tr a t eρ (otherwise
the respective ﬁrm would not have entered the market). Therefore, it is optimal for each
incumbent to enter in the ﬁrst period and never to exit.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 : The proof is by contradiction. Consider some ﬁrm that in a
stationary equilibrium oﬀers quality ¯ v ∈ (0,1) for the price p(¯ v) > ˆ p(¯ v). Assume the ﬁrm
increases quality ¯ v to ¯ v + ε > ¯ v. Since Rv (¯ v,smin) > γ, there exists a price p(¯ v + ε) such
that p(¯ v)+εRv (¯ v,smin) >p (¯ v + ε) >p (¯ v)+εγ. In addition, p(¯ v) > ˆ p(¯ v) implies that
28for a suﬃciently small ε > 0 the inequality p(¯ v + ε) ≥ ˆ p(¯ v)+
ργ
ϕ ε =ˆ p(¯ v + ε) is satisﬁed.
Moreover, if ε > 0 is suﬃciently small, it holds for each customer of the respective ﬁrm
that R(¯ v + ε,s) − R(¯ v,s) ≥ εRv (¯ v,smin) ≥ p(¯ v + ε) − p(¯ v) because Rvs(·,·) > 0 for all
v>0, and thus R(¯ v + ε,s) − p(¯ v + ε) ≥ R(¯ v,s) − p(¯ v). Therefore, under the alternative
strategy of announcing and producing quality ¯ v + ε and charging the price p(¯ v + ε) <
p(¯ v)+εRv (¯ v,smin) the ﬁrm has at least as many customers as under the original strategy
of selling quality ¯ v for the price p(¯ v). In addition, since p(¯ v + ε) >p (¯ v)+εγ and thus
p(¯ v + ε) − c(¯ v + ε) >p(¯ v)+εγ − c(¯ v) − γε = p(¯ v) − c(¯ v), the ﬁrm’s proﬁt per customer
will increase. Consequently, the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ will increase, and hence the strategy to oﬀer
quality ¯ v ∈ (0,1) for the price p(¯ v) > ˆ p(¯ v) cannot optimal. This contradicts the assumption
that it is an equilibrium strategy. If Rv (v,s) > γ for all v ∈ (0,1) and all s ∈ S, then the
s a m ea r g u m e n ts h o w st h a ti tc a n n o tb eo p t i m a lt oo ﬀer any quality v ∈ (0,1) for a price
p(v) > ˆ p(v). Finally, p(0) = c(0) = ˆ p(0) holds trivially.
Proof of Proposition 3: First, we show by contradiction that if there is only one brand
name, it will oﬀer maximum quality v =1 . Clearly, in a stationary equilibrium the respective
single brand name will not oﬀer minimum quality v =0since proﬁts would be zero and the
entry cost could not be covered. Assume the respective brand name oﬀe r ss o m eq u a l i t yl e v e l
¯ v ∈ (0,1) for some price p(¯ v) ≥ ˆ p(¯ v)=c(0)+αγ¯ v. For any customer s of the brand name it
must hold that she prefers v =¯ v for the price p(¯ v) to (i) v =0for the price p(0) = c(0) and
(ii) to not buying at all, i.e., it must hold that R(¯ v,s) − p(¯ v) ≥ max[R(0,s) − c(0),0]. If
R(¯ v,s)−p(¯ v) ≥ R(0,s)−c(0) ≥ 0, then R(¯ v,s)−R(0,s) ≥ p(¯ v)−c(0) ≥ ˆ p(¯ v)−c(0) =
αγ¯ v. Moreover, if for some s ∈ S, R(¯ v,s) − R(0,s) ≥ αγ¯ v for some ¯ v ∈ (0,1), then




¯ v . Thus, R(¯ v,s) − p(¯ v) ≥ R(0,s) − c(0) implies R(1,s) − [p(¯ v)+( 1− ¯ v)αγ] ≥
R(¯ v,s)−p(¯ v). In addition, if R(¯ v,s)−p(¯ v) ≥ 0 >R(0,s)−c(0), then R(¯ v,s)−R(0,s) >





¯ v > αγ gives R(1,s) >R(¯ v,s)+( 1− ¯ v)αγ. Consequently,
R(¯ v,s) − p(¯ v) ≥ max[R(0,s) − c(0),0] always implies R(1,s) − [p(¯ v)+( 1− ¯ v)αγ] ≥
R(¯ v,s)−p(¯ v). B e c a u s eo ft h i s ,t h er e s p e c t i v eb r a n dn a m ew i l ln o tl o s ed e m a n d ,i fi to ﬀers
quality v =1for the price p(1) = p(¯ v)+( 1− ¯ v)αγ instead of quality ¯ v ∈ (0,1) for the
price p(¯ v). In addition, its proﬁt per customer will increase from (α − 1)γ¯ v to (α − 1)γ. It
follows that if there is only one brand name, it will oﬀer maximum quality v =1 .
29Consider now the case of at least two brand names. By the same argument as before,
at least one ﬁrm oﬀers quality v =1 . If two or more ﬁrms oﬀer quality v =1 ,p(1) = ˆ p(1)
because of Bertrand competition. In this case, any third ﬁrm that oﬀe r ss o m eq u a l i t y
¯ v ∈ (0,1) for some price p(¯ v) ≥ ˆ p(¯ v) will attract customer type s only if R(¯ v,s) − p(¯ v) ≥
max[R(1,s) − ˆ p(1),R(0,s) − c(0),0]. However, we have already shown that R(¯ v,s) −
p(¯ v) ≥ max[R(0,s) − c(0),0] implies R(¯ v,s) − p(¯ v) ≤ R(1,s) − [p(¯ v)+( 1− ¯ v)αγ] ≤
R(1,s)−[ˆ p(¯ v)+( 1− ¯ v)αγ]=R(1,s)− ˆ p(1). That is, whenever some type s prefers v =¯ v
for the price p(¯ v) to v =0for the price p(0) = c(0) and to not buying at all, that type
prefers, at least weakly, v =1for the price ˆ p(1) to v =¯ v for the price p(¯ v).C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
any ﬁrm that oﬀers some quality ¯ v ∈ (0,1) for some price p(¯ v) ≥ ˆ p(¯ v) has demand of
measure zero, and thus zero proﬁts, and cannot cover its entry cost. Hence whenever at
least two ﬁrms oﬀer v =1no intermediate quality v ∈ (0,1) will be available in the market.
The same conclusion follows if only one ﬁrm oﬀers v =1for the price p(1) = ˆ p(1). The
r e m a i n i n gc a s ei st h eo n ew h e r ev =1is being oﬀered for some price p(1) > ˆ p(1) by
as i n g l eﬁrm and at least one other ﬁrm oﬀers ¯ v ∈ (0,1) for some price p(¯ v) ≥ ˆ p(¯ v).
We have already shown that R(¯ v,s) − p(¯ v) ≥ max[R(0,s) − c(0),0] implies R(1,s) −
[p(¯ v)+( 1− ¯ v)αγ] ≥ R(¯ v,s)−p(¯ v). Therefore, the ﬁrm oﬀering v =¯ v can have customers
only if p(1) ≥ p(¯ v)+( 1− ¯ v)αγ since otherwise R(¯ v,s) − p(¯ v) ≥ max[R(0,s) − c(0),0]
implies R(¯ v,s) − p(¯ v) ≤ R(1,s) − [p(¯ v)+( 1− ¯ v)αγ] <R (1,s) − p(1), i.e., rather than
buying v =¯ v for the price p(¯ v) each type s ∈ S prefers either not to buy at all, to buy
v =0or to buy v =1 . If equality p(1) = p(¯ v)+( 1− ¯ v)αγ holds, the set of customers is of
measure zero, thus positive proﬁts of the ﬁrm oﬀering v =¯ v imply p(1) >p(¯ v)+(1− ¯ v)αγ.
If the respective ﬁrm oﬀers instead v =1for the price ˜ p(1) = p(¯ v)+( 1− ¯ v)αγ <p(1), it
will not lose any customers (because, as shown, R(1,s) − ˜ p(1) ≥ R(¯ v,s) − p(¯ v) for each
customer s) and take all customers from the rival ﬁrm that oﬀers v =1for some price
p(1) > ˜ p(1). In addition, its proﬁt per customer and hence its payoﬀ increases. Thus, also
in this last case it cannot be an equilibrium that some ﬁrm oﬀers some intermediate quality
¯ v ∈ (0,1). Consequently, there is no case where a brand name oﬀers an intermediate quality
v ∈ (0,1). In contrast, it is an equilibrium that all brand names oﬀer quality v =1for
the price ˆ p(1), provided the market can accommodate at least two ﬁrms (i.e., if two ﬁrms
oﬀer quality v =1for the price ˆ p(1), each ﬁrm’s discounted stream of proﬁts covers the
entry cost). If the market accommodates at least one ﬁrm (i.e., if for a single ﬁrm that
30oﬀers quality v =1for the proﬁt-maximizing price p(1) ≥ ˆ p(1) the discounted stream of
proﬁts covers the entry cost), quality v =1will be available in the market for some price
p(1) ≥ ˆ p(1). For the proof of the second part of the proposition, which assumes Rs (1,·) > 0,
consider ﬁrst the case where quality v =1is available for some price p(1) ≥ ˆ p(1) and is
demanded by some but not all customers, i.e., R(1,s max)−p(1) ≥ max[R(0,s max) − c(0),0]
and R(1,s min) − p(1) ≤ max[R(0,s min) − c(0),0]. Then there exists a unique type ¯ s ∈ S
such that R(1, ¯ s) − p(1) = max[R(0, ¯ s) − c(0),0]. Uniqueness follows because R(1,·)
and s = R(1,·) − R(0,·) are both strictly increasing in s and because of the following
contradiction: if R(1, ¯ s)−p(1) = R(0, ¯ s)−c(0) > 0 and R(1, ¯ s0)−p(1) = 0 >R(0, ¯ s0)−c(0)
for some ¯ s ∈ S and ¯ s0 ∈ S, then R(1, ¯ s)−p(1) > 0=R(1, ¯ s0)−p(1) implies ¯ s>¯ s0 because
Rs (1,·) > 0,w h e r e a sR(1, ¯ s)−p(1) = R(0, ¯ s)−c(0) and R(1, ¯ s0)−p(1) >R(0, ¯ s0)−c(0)
imply ¯ s = R(1, ¯ s) − R(0, ¯ s)=p(1) − c(0) <R (1, ¯ s0) − R(0, ¯ s0)=¯ s0 and thus ¯ s0 > ¯ s.
Moreover, because R(1,·) and s = R(1,·) − R(0,·) are both strictly increasing in s,a l l
types s ∈ [smin, ¯ s) either consume quality v =0or abstain from consuming the good, and
all types s ∈ (¯ s,smax] consume quality v =1 . Since R(1,s) − ˆ p(1) = R(1,s) − c(0) − αγ
decreases strictly with α,t h es o l u t i o n¯ s of R(1, ¯ s) − ˆ p(1) = max[R(0, ¯ s) − c(0),0] must
also strictly decrease with α for ¯ s ∈ (smin,s max). Finally, if all types s ∈ [smin,s max] demand
v =1 , ¯ s = smin; and if no type s ∈ [smin,s max] demands v =1 , ¯ s = smax.
Proof of Proposition 4: First we show that at the price p(1) = ˆ p(1) demand for quality
v =1is bounded from below by 1 − F (s1), regardless of the availability of other quality
levels. Since Rv (1,s) and R(1,s) are both strictly increasing in s, the deﬁnition of s1 implies
that for all s>s 1 it holds that Rv (1,s) > αγ and R(1,s) > ˆ p(1). Since Rvv (v,s) ≤ 0
and Rv (1,s) > αγ imply R(1,s) − R(v,s)=
R 1
v Rv (w,s)dw >
R 1
v αγdw =( 1− v)αγ =
ˆ p(1) − ˆ p(v),i th o l d st h a tR(1,s) − ˆ p(1) >R (v,s) − ˆ p(v). Therefore, at the price ˆ p(1)
every type s>s 1 strictly prefers quality v =1to buying any other quality v<1 for a
price p(v) ≥ ˆ p(v). Moreover, R(1,s) > ˆ p(1) implies that type s strictly prefers to buy
quality v =1for the price ˆ p(1) to not buying. Consequently, at the price p(1) = ˆ p(1)
every type s>s 1 demands one unit of quality v =1and thus total demand for quality
v =1is at least 1 − F (s1). If n ≥ 1 brand names oﬀer v =1for the price ˆ p(1) each has
ap r o ﬁt per period of at least 1
n [1 − F (s1)][ˆ p(1) − c(1)] = 1
n [1 − F (s1)](α − 1)γ. If n ≥ 2
brand names oﬀer quality v =1 , Bertrand competition implies that all charge the price
p(1) = ˆ p(1). For all intermediate qualities v ∈ (0,1) the price is p(v)=ˆ p(v) because of
31Proposition 2 and Rv (·,·) > γ for v>0. Therefore, the proﬁt per customer that a ﬁrm
oﬀering v<1 achieves is (α − 1)γv<(α − 1)γ (hence no brand name will oﬀer v =0 ).
Moreover, if some brand name oﬀers quality v =1for the price p(1) = ˆ p(1), total demand
for all intermediate quality levels v ∈ (0,1) is bounded from above by F (s1) − F (s0).
In this case, if k ≥ 1 brand names oﬀer (identical or diﬀerent) intermediate quality levels
v ∈ (0,1), the lowest proﬁt per period must be less than 1
k [F (s1) − F (s0)](α − 1)γ, because
1
k [F (s1) − F (s0)](α − 1)γ exceeds the average proﬁto ft h o s ek ﬁrms. A necessary condition
for a stationary equilibrium where k ﬁrms oﬀer some intermediate quality levels and n ﬁrms
oﬀer quality v =1 , is that no ﬁrm can increase its payoﬀ,i fi ts w i t c h e st os o m eo t h e r
quality. This implies, in particular, that a brand name with the lowest proﬁtp e rp e r i o d
among the k ≥ 1 brand names that oﬀer intermediate quality levels must not be able
to increase its proﬁt per period if it switches to quality v =1 . Denote by π the lowest
proﬁt per period that a brand name that has chosen some intermediate quality v ∈ (0,1)
achieves, and by ψ the one that this brand name achieves instead if it switches to quality
v =1 . If k ≥ 1 ﬁrms oﬀer some intermediate quality levels v ∈ (0,1) and either n ≥ 2
ﬁrms oﬀer quality v =1 , which implies p(1) = ˆ p(1),o rn =1ﬁrm oﬀers quality v =1
for the price p(1) = ˆ p(1), the equilibrium condition π ≥ ψ, together with the previous
arguments, implies 1
k [F (s1) − F (s0)](α − 1)γ > π ≥ ψ ≥ 1





k . Because n + k = N, this gives n>λ(N +1 )− 1 whenever
n ≤ N − 1 (the condition k ≥ 1 excludes n = N)a n dp(1) = ˆ p(1).
Consider now the case where all N brand names in the market oﬀer some intermediate
quality levels v ∈ (0,1). In this case the average (and thus the minimal) proﬁtp e rp e r i o di s
strictly less than 1
N [1 − F (s0)](α − 1)γ. Since a brand name can always oﬀer quality v =1
for the price p(1) = ˆ p(1) and receive a proﬁt per period of at least [1 − F (s1)](α − 1)γ, it
must hold that [1 − F (s1)] < 1
N [1 − F (s0)] and thus λN<1. Consequently, the proposi-
tion’s assumption N ≥ 1
λ +1implies that at least one ﬁrm oﬀers maximum quality v =1 .
Consider now the case where out of N brand names in the market N −1 oﬀer some interme-
diate quality levels v ∈ (0,1) and one oﬀers maximum quality v =1 . We have to distinguish
the subcase where the ﬁrm that oﬀers v =1charges a price p(1) = ˆ p(1) from the subcase
where it charges a price p(1) > ˆ p(1). The subcase p(1) = ˆ p(1) has already been dealt
with above: k = N − 1 ﬁrms oﬀer some intermediate quality levels and n =1ﬁrm oﬀers
quality v =1for the price p(1) = ˆ p(1). We concluded that n>λ(N +1 )−1. Since n =1 ,
32N<2
λ −1. Consider now the subcase p(1) > ˆ p(1). In this subcase the average (and thus the
minimal) proﬁtp e rp e r i o do ft h eN − 1 ﬁrms is strictly less than 1
N−1 [1 − F (s0)](α − 1)γ.
If a brand name switches from intermediate quality to maximum quality and charges the
price ˆ p(1), it gets all the customers buying v =1a n dt h u sr e c e i v e sap r o ﬁtp e rp e r i o d
of at least [1 − F (s1)](α − 1)γ. Since this must not increase the respective ﬁrm’s payoﬀ,
[1 − F (s1)] < 1
N−1 [1 − F (s0)],o r(N − 1)λ < 1. Thus, N<1
λ +1 . Hence the proposition’s
assumption N ≥ 1
λ +1implies that at least two brand names must oﬀer maximum quality
v =1 . From of the analysis above it follows that n>λ(N +1 )− 1 whenever n ≤ N − 1.
For n = N the inequality is also satisﬁed, provided λ < 1. If λ =1(and N ≥ 2), n = N
follows because every n ≤ N − 1 violates n>λ(N +1 )− 1=N. Hence for every possible
case that is compatible with N ≥ 1
λ +1it must hold (i) that n>λ(N +1 )−1 if λ < 1 and
n = N if λ =1 , and (ii) that p(1) = ˆ p(1).





. This implies λ
1−λ ≥ 3 and thus λ ≥ 3
4. F i r s tw es h o wt h a t
at least one brand name oﬀers quality v =1 . If no brand name oﬀers quality v =1 , brand
names’ average proﬁt per period is below 1
N [1 − F (s0)](α − 1)γ ≤ 1




λ (α − 1)γ ≤ 4
9 [1 − F (s1)](α − 1)γ < [1 − F (s1)](α − 1)γ because N ≥ 3 and
λ ≥ 3
4. Thus, at least one brand name can do better by oﬀering v =1for the price
p(1) = ˆ p(1). Hence in a stationary equilibrium at least n ≥ 1 brand names oﬀer v =1 . If
n ≥ 2,p(1) = ˆ p(1) follows because of Bertrand competition. If p(1) = ˆ p(1), total demand
for intermediate quality levels is bounded by F (s1) − F (s0). Thus, if p(1) = ˆ p(1) and k ∈
[1,N− 1] ﬁrms oﬀer intermediate quality levels, their average proﬁt per period is bounded by
1
k [F (s1) − F (s0)](α − 1)γ ≤ 1
N [1 − F (s1)](α − 1)γ ≤ 1
N−k+1 [1 − F (s1)](α − 1)γ, where
the ﬁrst inequality holds because N ≤ λ
1−λ =
1−F(s1)
F(s1)−F(s0) gives F (s1)−F (s0) ≤ 1
N [1 − F (s1)].
Consequently, a ﬁrm with the minimum proﬁta m o n gt h ek ∈ [1,N− 1] ﬁrms oﬀering in-
termediate quality levels can increase its payoﬀ,i fi to ﬀers v =1for the price p(1) = ˆ p(1).
Therefore, whenever a brand name oﬀers v =1for the price p(1) = ˆ p(1), this must hold for
all N brand names in the market. Proposition 4 follows, if we can exclude that n =1brand
name oﬀers v =1for some price p(1) > ˆ p(1) and the k = N−1 remaining brand names all of-
fer intermediate quality levels. Because N ≥ 3 and, since λ ≥ 3
4, 1−F (s0)=1
λ [1 − F (s1)] ≤
4
3 [1 − F (s1)], the average proﬁt per period of the latter k = N − 1 remaining brand names
is bounded by 1
N−1 [1 − F (s0)](α − 1)γ ≤ 1
2
4
3 [1 − F (s1)](α − 1)γ < [1 − F (s1)](α − 1)γ.
Since p(1) > ˆ p(1), a brand name that switches from v ∈ (0,1) to v =1and charges the price
33ˆ p(1) gets all the demand for v =1 , which is at least 1 − F (s1), a n dt h u sa c h i e v e sap r o ﬁt
per period of at least [1 − F (s1)](α − 1)γ. The previous inequality shows that this is more
than a brand name with the minimal proﬁt per period among those oﬀering intermediate
quality levels achieves. Hence it cannot be a stationary equilibrium that n =1brand name
oﬀers v =1for the price p(1) > ˆ p(1) and the k = N − 1 remaining brand names all oﬀer





we have excluded all cases where some
brand name oﬀers some intermediate quality level as an outcome of a stationary equilibrium.
Since N ≥ 3,p(1) = ˆ p(1) follows.
Proof of Proposition 5: F i r s tw es h o wt h a ti ti sa ne q u i l i b r i u mt h a tt h e r ea r eN ≥ 2
brand names in the market, all of which oﬀer quality v =1 . Recall that Rv (·,·) > γ for all
v ∈ (0,1) implies p(v)=ˆ p(v) for all v ∈ (0,1) and a proﬁt per customer of (α − 1)γv. Since
N ≥ 2, Bertrand competition implies p(1) = ˆ p(1). Aggregate demand for quality v =1is
1−F (¯ s) and each brand name in the market has a proﬁtp e rp e r i o do f 1
N [1 − F (¯ s)](α − 1)γ.
Since ηρ ≤ 1
N [1 − F (¯ s)](α − 1)γ, each brand name in the market has a non-negative payoﬀ
1
ρN [1 − F (¯ s)](α − 1)γ −η ≥ 0 and thus is at least not worse oﬀ than if it stayed out of the
market. Consider a brand name that has the strategy not to enter the market, but deviates
and enters. The proﬁt per period it gets is 1
N+1 [1 − F (¯ s)](α − 1)γ, if it oﬀers quality v =1 ,
and is less than [F (s1) − F (s0)](α − 1)γ, if it oﬀe r ss o m ei n t e r m e d i a t eq u a l i t yv ∈ (0,1).
The inequalities 1
N+1 [1 − F (¯ s)](α − 1)γ ≤ ηρ and [F (s1) − F (s0)](α − 1)γ ≤ ηρ imply
that the resulting payoﬀ is non-positive in each case. Thus, the deviation does not increase
the payoﬀ. Finally, if a brand name in the market deviates to some quality v ∈ [0,1),i t sp r o ﬁt
p e rp e r i o di sl e s st h a n[F (s1) − F (s0)](α − 1)γ, and since [F (s1) − F (s0)](α − 1)γ ≤
ηρ ≤ 1
N [1 − F (¯ s)](α − 1)γ the deviation decreases its payoﬀ. This proves the ﬁrst part
of the proposition. Consider now the case where N ≥ 3. As a ﬁr s ts t e pw es h o wt h a tt h e
proposition’s inequalities imply 1 − F (s0) < N−1
N−2 [1 − F (s1)]. From concavity of R(·, ¯ s)
in v and the deﬁnition of ¯ s it follows that Rv (0, ¯ s) ≥ R(1, ¯ s) − R(0, ¯ s) ≥ p(1) − c(0) ≥
ˆ p(1) − c(0) = αγ and thus ¯ s ≥ s0, since the deﬁnition of s0 (at the beginning of Section 7)
implies Rv (0,s) < αγ for s<s 0. Because of η > 0 and the proposition’s ﬁrst inequal-
ity, − 1
N [1 − F (¯ s)] < 0 ≤ F (¯ s) − F (s0) and thus 1 − F (s0) > N−1
N [1 − F (¯ s)]. From this
and the assumption [F (s1) − F (s0)](α − 1)γ ≤ ηρ ≤ 1
N [1 − F (¯ s)](α − 1)γ, which implies
F (s1) − F (s0) ≤ 1
N [1 − F (¯ s)], it follows that 1 − F (s0) ≤ 1 − F (s1)+ 1
N [1 − F (¯ s)] <
1 − F (s1)+ 1
N−1 [1 − F (s0)] and hence 1 − F (s0) < N−1
N−2 [1 − F (s1)]. If k ∈ [N − 1,N]
34brand names oﬀer intermediate quality levels, their average proﬁt per period is less than
1
k [1 − F (s0)](α − 1)γ < N−1
2(N−2) [1 − F (s1)](α − 1)γ ≤ [1 − F (s1)](α − 1)γ because k ≥
N − 1 ≥ 2 and N ≥ 3. Whenever n = N − k ≤ 1 ﬁrms oﬀer maximum quality v =1
and p(1) > ˆ p(1) if n =1 , a brand name that switches from intermediate to maximum
quality and charges the price ˆ p(1) gets all the demand for v =1and thus achieves a proﬁt
p e rp e r i o dt h a ti sa tl e a s t[1 − F (s1)](α − 1)γ > 1
k [1 − F (s0)](α − 1)γ. Consequently, it
cannot be a stationary equilibrium that k ∈ [N − 1,N] brand names oﬀer intermediate
quality levels and p(1) > ˆ p(1) if k = N − 1. There remain two cases that we need to
exclude: (i) k ∈ [1,N− 2] brand names oﬀer intermediate quality levels, which implies that
n = N − k ≥ 2 brand names oﬀer maximum quality and thus p(1) = ˆ p(1);( i i )k = N − 1
brand names oﬀer intermediate quality levels and the brand name that oﬀers maximum qual-
ity charges the price p(1) = ˆ p(1). In both cases it holds that p(1) = ˆ p(1), and thus that
the average proﬁt per period of the ﬁrms that oﬀer some intermediate quality v ∈ (0,1) is
less than 1
k [F (s1) − F (s0)](α − 1)γ ≤ [F (s1) − F (s0)](α − 1)γ ≤ ηρ. Therefore, at least
one brand name that oﬀers intermediate quality cannot cover its entry cost and thus the
constellation cannot be the outcome of a a stationary equilibrium. In addition, it holds
even for the continuation game that takes place after entry among the N brand names in
the market, that in every equilibrium where equilibrium strategies are constant all N brand
names oﬀer maximum quality.34 It follows that in every stationary equilibrium all N brand
names in the market must oﬀer maximum quality v =1 . The ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep r o p o s i t i o n
34Notice that we need to consider only the case where quality v =1is available for the price p(1) = ˆ p(1).
Hence whenever k ≥ 1 brand names oﬀer some intermediate quality levels, their average proﬁtp e rp e r i o di s
less than 1
k [F (s1) − F (s0)](α − 1)γ. From N−1
N−2 [1 − F (s1)] > 1 − F (s0)=[ 1− F (s1)] + [F (s1) − F (s0)]
it follows that F (s1) − F (s0) < 1
N−2 [1 − F (s1)]. If k ≥ 2 and one of the k ﬁrms oﬀering intermediate
quality switches to maximum quality v =1 , its resulting proﬁti sa tl e a s t 1
N−k+1 [1 − F (s1)](α − 1)γ ≥
1
(N−2)k [1 − F (s1)](α − 1)γ > 1
k [F (s1) − F (s0)](α − 1)γ, where the ﬁrst inequality follows because N ≥ 3
and k ≥ 2, which implies (N − 2)k−(N − k +1 )=Nk−k−N−1=( N − 1)(k − 1)−2 ≥ 0, and the second
inequality follows from F (s1) − F (s0) < 1
N−2 [1 − F (s1)].I f k =1brand name oﬀers some intermediate
quality, its proﬁt per period is less than [F (s1) − F (s0)](α − 1)γ. If it switches to maximum quality v =1 ,
the resulting proﬁtp e rp e r i o di s 1
N [1 − F (¯ s)](α − 1)γ because then all N brand names oﬀer maximum
quality. Hence the propositions’s assumption [F (s1) − F (s0)](α − 1)γ ≤ ηρ ≤ 1
N [1 − F (¯ s)](α − 1)γ im-
plies that the respective brand name increases its payoﬀ by switching to maximum quality. Therefore, in
every equilibrium of the continuation game where equilibrium strategies are constant all brand names in the
market oﬀer maximum quality.
35implies that a respective stationary equilibrium does, in fact, exist.
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